Wouldn’t It Be Nice: Searching for Clarity in Intermittent Strike Adjudication by Fiascone, Thomas B.
Boston College Law Review
Volume 59 | Issue 4 Article 7
4-26-2018
Wouldn’t It Be Nice: Searching for Clarity in
Intermittent Strike Adjudication
Thomas B. Fiascone
Boston College Law School, thomas.fiascone@bc.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information, please
contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas B. Fiascone, Wouldn’t It Be Nice: Searching for Clarity in Intermittent Strike Adjudication, 59 B.C.L. Rev. 1433 (2018),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol59/iss4/7
  
1433 
WOULDN’T IT BE NICE: SEARCHING  
FOR CLARITY IN INTERMITTENT  
STRIKE ADJUDICATION 
Abstract: An employee’s right to strike has been a fundamental piece of Ameri-
can labor law policy since its codification in the 1935 National Labor Relations 
Act. Recently, however, strike activity has undergone a dramatic transformation 
in response to rapidly declining rates of unionization. Instead of numerous union 
members striking for weeks on end, small numbers of employees have engaged 
in surprise one-day strikes in an attempt to maximize the potential effect on em-
ployers despite the strike’s brief nature. Such strikes, often referred to as “inter-
mittent strikes,” fall into an area of legal ambiguity due to prior inconsistent ad-
judication. As the law currently stands, it is difficult to determine when these 
brief strikes warrant National Labor Relations Act protection or when an em-
ployee could be subject to discipline for engaging in the activity. In October 
2016, the Office of the General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board 
proposed a new framework to promote clarity in this area of labor law. In De-
cember 2017, after the administration change, the newly sworn-in General Coun-
sel of the National Labor Relations Board rescinded that proposed framework, 
relegating intermittent strikes back to their previous state of legal uncertainty. 
This Note argues that while the clarity offered by the rescinded framework would 
have been a welcome addition to intermittent strike law, that framework still left 
some areas too ambiguous to provide a workable standard and may have been 
overly favorable to employees. With a few minor changes, the Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel could propose a new framework that employers and employees on 
both sides of the political spectrum find agreeable, while also providing much 
needed clarity. 
INTRODUCTION 
On November 2, 2012, the Walmart store in Richmond, California opened 
its doors, as it does every day of the week, at 6:00 a.m.1 Shortly before its 
opening, however, a group of six temporary Walmart employees ceased work-
ing to engage in an in-store protest challenging the conduct of their project 
supervisor and Walmart’s apparent lack of response thereto.2 It was the second 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 1 (Aug. 27, 2016). 
 2 Id. Employees Raymond Bravo, Semetra Lee, Demario Hammond, Misty Tanner, Markeith 
Washington, and Timothy Whitney alleged in their unfair labor practice charge that their field project 
supervisor Art Van Riper had treated them unfairly, made racist and derogatory comments, and had 
threatened bodily harm. Id. at 1–2. Prior to the charge, the employees had sent a letter directly to 
Walmart recounting Van Riper’s “racist remarks and threats of physical violence,” and describing 
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work stoppage at the Richmond Walmart in less than a month.3 The six em-
ployees, wearing green shirts emblazoned with “OUR Walmart,” engaged in 
their work stoppage for less than an hour and a half in total.4 They were joined, 
at points, by non-employee protestors.5 The comingled groups stood in a cus-
tomer service area, and eventually moved to an aisle by the entrance of the 
store.6 By 6:52 a.m., the six employees had handed in their daily timesheets 
and all protestors had exited the store.7 Similar scenes have been playing out at 
Walmart stores across the United States.8 In 2013, in Baker, Louisiana, a group 
of Walmart employees went on strike and drove to a Walmart shareholder 
meeting in Bentonville, Arkansas.9 Further, there have been numerous news-
worthy strikes on Black Friday over the past few years.10 
                                                                                                                           
how Van Riper’s conduct created an overall untenable workplace environment. Id. at 2. The employ-
ees went so far as to ask for Van Riper’s termination. Id. Walmart, however, did not respond. Id. 
 3 Id. at 2. Employees Hammond, Tanner, and Washington previously went on strike on October 
9th and 10th, protesting Walmart’s general mistreatment of its employees. Id. They were joined by 
other associates from the Richmond store. Id. The three employees submitted a letter offering to return 
to work on October 11th. Id. Upon offering to return, the employees’ supervisor allegedly said, “If it 
were up to me, I’d shoot the union.” Id. 
 4 Id. The OUR Walmart campaign (“Organization United for Respect at Walmart”) is a non-
unionized nationwide group of Walmart employees whose goal is to achieve fairer pay, equitable 
benefits, and general respect for Walmart employees. See Steven Greenhouse, Wal-Mart Workers Try 
the Nonunion Route, N.Y. TIMES (June 14, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/15/business/15
walmart.html [https://perma.cc/8KVW-HW63] (describing OUR Walmart’s efforts to organize 
Walmart employees outside of the traditional union structure). 
 5 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 118, at 2. 
 6 Id. at 2–3. 
 7 Id. at 3. 
 8 See, e.g., Dave Jamieson, Walmart Workers Launch Black Friday Strike, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Nov. 26, 2014), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/11/26/walmart-workers-protest_n_6225034.
html [https://perma.cc/5FXX-4ZR5] (noting three consecutive years of protests on Black Friday by 
Walmart workers across the United States); Ashlee Kieler, Labor Board Orders Walmart to Rehire 16 
Employees Fired for Striking, CONSUMERIST (Jan. 22, 2016), https://consumerist.com/2016/01/22/
labor-board-orders-walmart-to-rehire-16-employees-fired-for-striking/ [https://perma.cc/M2YM-
UKLD] (detailing strikes at various Walmart stores in Arkansas and California). 
 9 Dave Jamieson, Labor Groups Are Taking on Walmart and McDonald’s. But Who Will Fund 
Their Fight?, HUFFINGTON POST (June 2, 2016), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/our-walmart-
funding_us_574f4b70e4b0eb20fa0cac8b [https://perma.cc/6MRM-TLYW]. In a move orchestrated by 
OUR Walmart, Walmart worker Janet Sparks, at the time earning $13.25 an hour after ten years of 
employment, took her plight to Walmart’s headquarters. Id. Walmart granted Sparks three minutes to 
address the shareholders, during which she noted the disparity between workers’ pay and Walmart 
executives’ bonuses. Josh Eidelson, Whose Walmart?: Workers Crash Walmart’s Party, NATION 
(June 17, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/whose-walmart-workers-crash-walmarts-party/ 
[https://perma.cc/X5VY-TX4Y]. The Walmart chairman cut Sparks off at the three-minute mark, and 
the shareholder meeting trudged on. Id. 
 10 See Jamieson, supra note 8. Prior to Black Friday in 2014, for example, workers in California, 
Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, Virginia, and Wisconsin delivered notices to their employers of their 
intent to go on strike. Id. Jamieson’s article notes that Walmart workers have consistently used Black 
Friday to raise awareness regarding Walmart’s pay practices. Id. 
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Walmart employees are famously (or perhaps infamously, depending on 
which side of the debate one falls) non-unionized.11 Non-union workers retain 
the right to strike, but due to the lack of union protection are more vulnerable 
to replacement than their unionized counterparts.12 In recent years, however, a 
non-union group, the Organization United for Respect at Walmart (“OUR 
Walmart”), has attempted to fight for Walmart workers’ rights while avoiding 
traditional unionization.13 OUR Walmart, at one point backed by the United 
Food and Commercial Workers (“UFCW”) union, fights for more equitable 
treatment for Walmart employees.14 Unlike traditional unions, OUR Walmart 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See Susan Berfield, How Walmart Keeps an Eye on Its Massive Workforce, BLOOMBERG BUSI-
NESSWEEK (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2015-walmart-union-surveillance/ 
[https://perma.cc/7SSD-LYAF] (detailing Walmart’s extraordinary steps to keep tabs on the OUR 
Walmart Campaign); Julie Gutman Dickinson, Walmart’s War Against Unions—and the U.S. Laws 
That Make It Possible, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 5, 2013), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/julie-b-
gutman/walmart-labor-laws_b_3390994.html [https://perma.cc/S74U-PUHQ] (noting Walmart’s 
success in preventing its workforce from organizing); Steven Greenhouse, How Walmart Persuades 
Its Workers Not to Unionize, ATLANTIC (June 8, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2015/06/how-walmart-convinces-its-employees-not-to-unionize/395051/ [https://perma.cc/R7G3-
J68T] (recounting stories from a former Walmart store manager whose store experienced anti-union 
efforts); Aimee Picchi, Union: Walmart Shut 5 Stores Over Labor Activism, CBS NEWS (Apr. 20, 
2015), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/union-walmart-shut-5-stores-over-labor-activism/ [https://
perma.cc/V8HB-RF29] (noting United Food and Commercial Workers’ claim that Walmart closed 
five stores in retaliation to labor activism); Ann Zimmerman, Pro-Union Butchers at Wal-Mart Win a 
Battle, but Lose the War, WALL ST. J. (Apr. 11, 2000), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB955407680495
911513 [https://perma.cc/XW62-ZGQ6] (describing Walmart’s apparent retaliation for unionization 
of butchers). Walmart workers have faced additional hurdles in their fight when attempting to redress 
grievances via class action procedures. See generally Joseph A. Seiner, The Issue Class, 56 B.C. L. 
REV. 121, 126–29 (2015) (detailing the requirements for class certification in light of the then-recent 
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes decision, which struck down a proposed class of Walmart employees). 
 12 General Counsel Asks NLRB to Change Intermittent Strike Law, WOLTERS KLUWER (Mar. 8, 
2018), http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/news/general-counsel-asks-nlrb-to-change-
intermittent-strike-law/ [https://perma.cc/NL2E-SBEK]. 
 13 Greenhouse, supra note 4; OUR Declaration of Respect, OUR WALMART (Mar. 8, 2018), 
http://www.united4respect.org/our_declaration_of_respect [https://perma.cc/KY2F-KGX2]. The OUR 
Walmart declaration promulgates the group’s goal of having Walmart publicly commit to obeying 
what the group believes is a more equitable set of labor standards and working conditions. OUR Dec-
laration of Respect, supra. Among the standards sought are a fifteen-dollar minimum wage, full-time 
working schedules for employees that want them, more predictable schedules, affordable healthcare, 
consistent and transparent enforcement of company policies, and equal treatment. Id. OUR Walmart 
could perhaps be best categorized as a “worker center,” which is a term used to describe a collective 
operation, often operating with union support though not comprised of union members. See What Are 
Worker Centers?, WORKER CENTERS (Mar. 8, 2018), http://workercenters.com/what-are-worker-
centers/ [https://perma.cc/E46F-S92A] (defining worker centers in general terms). Worker centers 
often operate in sectors that have been traditionally hostile to formal unionization in an attempt to reap 
the benefits of NLRA protection without official union representation. Id. Worker centers have also 
been referred to as “alt-labor,” and the American Federation of Labor–Congress of International Or-
ganizations has endorsed their operation as a viable alternative to unionization. Id. 
 14 Peter Olney, Where Did the OUR Walmart Campaign Go Wrong?, IN THESE TIMES (Dec. 14, 
2015), http://inthesetimes.com/article/print/18692/our-walmart-union-ufcw-black-Friday [https://
perma.cc/3TU6-NEBH]; OUR Declaration of Respect, supra note 13. 
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does not negotiate contracts with employers, but instead describes itself as a 
grassroots operation aimed at eventual organization.15 The OUR Walmart 
campaign has seen its share of peaks and valleys, with one particularly notable 
valley being the formidable UFCW’s withdrawal of its funding in September 
2015.16 At the height of its operating abilities, however, OUR Walmart mem-
bers have carried out large-scale strikes, like the ones in California and Louisi-
ana, and the Black Friday strikes that tend to grab media attention on the big-
gest shopping day of the year.17 
Some media outlets have thus far doubted the sustainability of the OUR 
Walmart campaign.18 The UFCW’s funding withdrawal lent credence to these 
reservations.19 But a more prevalent issue is the legal ambiguity underlying the 
strike tactics in which OUR Walmart members have engaged.20 Walmart has 
thus far asserted that these strikes constitute unprotected “intermittent strikes,” 
a form of strike whose legality has been so unpredictably adjudicated that the 
Office of the General Counsel for the National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB” or “Board”) under President Obama issued a since-rescinded memo-
                                                                                                                           
 15 See Greenhouse, supra note 4 (noting that the difference between the OUR Walmart campaign 
and traditional unionization lies in the campaign’s ultimate goal of aiding workers without the con-
fines of traditional unionization); OUR Declaration of Respect, supra note 13 (promulgating the OUR 
Walmart declaration). 
 16 See Jamieson, supra note 9 (noting that the UFCW withdrew funding because OUR Walmart 
members were not official UFCW members, and the UFCW found it difficult to justify financially 
supporting workers who were not dues-paying members); Nathan Layne & Lisa Baertlein, Wal-Mart 
Worker Group Splits in Two; Both Sides Vow to Continue Wage Fight, REUTERS (Sept. 16, 2015), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-walmart-union-idUSKCN0RH06O20150917 [https://perma.cc/
3PL2-WJS6] (detailing the split between OUR Walmart and the UFCW). 
 17 See, e.g., Jamieson, supra note 8 (detailing Black Friday protests); Kieler, supra note 8 (detail-
ing additional strikes). 
 18 See Olney, supra note 14 (noting that without union-backing, the campaign’s prospects seem 
relatively dismal). In support, Olney dissects previous, similarly designed campaigns aimed at 
Walmart that failed terribly. Id. For example, the UFCW organized a single department within a 
Walmart store in Québec, and in response the store closed. Id. Similarly the meat department of a 
Texas Walmart organized its ten workers into a small union, only to see the department closed. Id. 
Olney’s ultimate prediction is that small-scale organizations simply cannot overcome an economic 
giant like Walmart that can afford large court fees and even negative judgments. Id. 
 19 See id. (noting that a union’s funding of a small campaign like OUR Walmart is financially 
unviable). Within a union, the decision to provide funding for activities outside the union itself is not 
an easy one to make or maintain. Id. Union leadership operates in a system where they must face re-
election, and if union members give up on funding these sorts of campaigns, the union leaders must 
respond in kind. Id. 
 20 See Robert M. Schwartz, One-Day Strikes: A Word to the Wise, LAB. NOTES (Oct. 2, 2013), 
http://www.labornotes.org/2013/10/one-day-strikes-word-wise [https://perma.cc/YS24-QTNH] (not-
ing that the NLRB doctrine regarding intermittent strikes, like the ones OUR Walmart workers engage 
in, is misunderstood and discordantly applied). In 2013, Schwartz noted that workers may easily lose 
NLRA protection by engaging in such tactics, and provided a list of precautions to take such as leav-
ing large gaps of time in between walkouts, and holding walkouts for different reasons, rather than the 
same reason each time, among others. Id. 
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randum attempting to create a brighter line between protected and unprotected 
strike activity under the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”).21 
A protected strike is one whose activity falls under the purview of the 
NLRA, which in turn governs what employers and employees can do during a 
strike.22 Most notably, employers cannot simply discharge employees for en-
gaging in lawful strike activity.23 Unprotected strikes fall outside the NLRA’s 
governance, and employers are accordingly free to respond to the strike as they 
see fit.24 Broadly speaking, the difference between protected and unprotected 
strikes lies in the form of the strike.25 The Board and the courts have generally 
                                                                                                                           
 21 Natalie C. Young, The NLRB’s General Counsel Rescinds, Revokes and Questions, NAT’L L. 
REV. (Dec. 21, 2017), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/nlrb-s-general-counsel-rescinds-revokes-
and-questions [https://perma.cc/A2L5-EBTW] (noting the rescission of OM Memorandum 17-02, the 
model brief regarding intermittent strikes). As Young notes, the rescission of the memorandum opens 
up the issue of intermittent strikes for re-evaluation, but until that time, intermittent strikes will be 
adjudicated by the Board based on the case law and precedent already in place. Id.; Matthew Bultman, 
NLRB Urged to Clarify Law on Intermittent Strikes, LAW360 (Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.law360.com/
articles/848550/print?section=corporate [https://perma.cc/RR4A-YKDX] (noting that intermittent 
strikes are presently an unsettled area of law); Michael J. Lotito, NLRB General Counsel Wants More 
Clarity & Employee Protection for Intermittent Strikes, LITTLER MENDELSON P.C. (Oct. 5, 2016), 
https://www.littler.com/publication-press/publication/nlrb-general-counsel-wants-more-clarity-and-
employee-protection [https://perma.cc/V4XQ-2BD9]; Steven Rosenfeld, Walmart’s Ridiculous Re-
sponse: “One Day Walkouts Are Not Legal Strikes,” ALTERNET (Feb. 15, 2014), http://www.alternet.
org/print/labor/walmarts-ridiculous-response-one-day-walkouts-are-not-legal-strikes [https://perma.
cc/H2XH-GN8F] (detailing arguments on both sides of the debate); see Farley Candy Co., 300 
N.L.R.B. 849, 849 (1990) (noting that intermittent strikes involve a plan to strike, returning to work, 
and subsequently striking again). 
 22 Craig Becker, “Better Than a Strike”: Protecting New Forms of Collective Work Stoppages 
Under the National Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 351, 376 (1994). Becker notes that de-
termining the form of a strike is key in deciding whether or not to extend NLRA protection. Id. The 
NLRA and subsequent case law has shaped each side’s rights during strikes. Id. at 353–54. Becker’s 
article provides an excellent overview of the history of intermittent strike law and the many court 
decisions that underlie the murky doctrine. See generally id. 
 23 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 163 (2012) (codifying employees’ rights to participate in lawful strikes 
without employer retaliation); Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisc. 
Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 152–53 (1976) (noting that even when activities are afforded 
Section 7 protection, employers are free to lock out their employees or hire replacement workers); 
Jasper Seating Co., 285 N.L.R.B. 550, 550–51 (1987) (noting an employer’s right to resort to hiring 
temporary replacement workers to maintain operations, specifically instead of outright discharge); 
Solo Cup Co., 114 N.L.R.B. 121, 133–34 (1955) (noting an employer’s right to dock pay during a 
strike). 
 24 See Becker, supra note 22, at 362–63 (describing some avenues of recourse for employers 
during a strike, such as a lockout or the hiring of replacement workers). 
 25 See id. at 354–55 (noting the different forms of strikes and which forms are presently afforded 
NLRA protection). Generally speaking, traditional strikes are characterized by a complete cessation of 
work, often until a resolution of the dispute in question is reached or is near. See Mark A. Hutcheson 
et al., Intermittent Strikes: Lawful or Not? Current Law and Emerging Issues, A.B.A. SECTION LA-
BOR & EMP. L 1–2 (Nov. 8–11, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_
law/2017/11/conference/papers/Jeff_pamela_Intermittent%20Strikes_%20Lawful%20or%20Not_.
authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/XGZ2-GUHM]. Intermittent strikes, on the other hand, involve a 
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held that work slowdowns (as opposed to full-on stoppages), sit-ins, partial 
strikes, and intermittent strikes are unprotected.26 These forms of strikes are 
often referred to as “non-traditional” strikes.27 Despite this attempt at categori-
zation, however, the Board and courts have offered little guidance on how to 
assign these classifications, particularly in instances that might toe the line be-
tween traditional and non-traditional strikes.28 
On October 3, 2016, the NLRB Office of the General Counsel (“OGC”) 
circulated a memorandum to NLRB Regional Directors noting the uptick in 
intermittent and partial strikes as a negotiation tactic and arguing that the 
NLRB’s current test for determining whether such activities are protected is 
“difficult to apply.”29 The most widely used definition of “intermittent strikes,” 
found in Board decisions, generally states that intermittent strikes involve a 
“plan or pattern” of conduct, particularly where the plan is to strike, return to 
work, and strike again.30 In order to resolve the issues created by applying this 
ambiguous definition, the OGC attached a model brief to their memorandum, 
which proposed a new framework for intermittent strike adjudication which it 
                                                                                                                           
predesigned pattern to strike, return to work, and strike again, often times irrespective of progress in 
the underlying dispute. Id. 
 26 See Roseville Dodge, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 882 F.2d 1355, 1359–60 (8th Cir. 1989) (declining to 
extend protection to intermittent work stoppages where the intent was to harass an employer); Sawyer 
of Napa, Inc., 300 N.L.R.B. 131, 137 (1990) (declining to extend protection to workers’ refusal to 
work mandatory overtime); Audubon Health Care Ctr., 268 N.L.R.B. 135, 136 (1983) (declining to 
extend protection to employees’ willingness to perform some, but not all, required tasks); Pac. Tel. & 
Tel. Co., 107 N.L.R.B. 1547, 1549–50 (1954) (declining to extend protection to work slowdowns). 
 27 See Becker, supra note 22, at 381 (referring to strikes that do not amount to a full work stop-
page as “non-traditional” strikes); see also Hutcheson et al., supra note 25, at 1–2 (noting general 
differences between traditional and intermittent strikes). 
 28 Int’l Union, Local 232 v. Wisc. Emp’t Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 264–65 (1949) (Briggs & 
Stratton) (holding that a union’s “recurrent or intermittent unannounced stoppage of work to win 
unstated ends” is not entitled to NLRA protection nor does the Act prohibit the activity); Becker, 
supra note 22, at 376 (noting that NLRB and court decisions have only served to leave this area of 
jurisprudence in an ambiguous state). 
 29 Memorandum from Beth Tursell, Acting Assoc. to the Gen. Counsel, to NLRB Reg’l Dirs., 
Officers-in-Charge, and Resident Officers (Oct. 3, 2016), http://files.constantcontact.com/f5aff54
8201/f18a6c51-e3cd-4c6f-b7e6-604b84e15dbc.pdf [https://perma.cc/LK97-4WAH] (noting that in-
termittent strikes are becoming a more frequently used tactic in the workplace and that the present test 
for adjudicating such tactics is hard to apply and potentially opens up some workers to discipline for 
what should be protected concerted activity). The memorandum goes on to refer to an attached model 
brief to be used in situations where these types of issues might be brought before the NLRB. Id. 
 30 See Farley Candy Co., 300 N.L.R.B. at 849 (noting that intermittent strikes involve a plan to 
strike, return to work, and strike again); Polytech, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 695, 696 (1972) (noting that the 
presumption of protected strike activity is rebutted when there is evidence of planned intermittent 
stoppages). More recently, the Board has characterized some strike behavior as “hit-and-run” and has 
deemed that behavior unprotected. Molon Motor & Coil Corp., 302 N.L.R.B. 138, 142 (1991). Inter-
mittent strikes are also considered to be a course of action distinct from partial strikes, which involve 
employees performing some parts of their job while refusing to do others, resulting in the “partial” 
nomenclature. Richard Mittenthal, Partial Strikes and National Labor Policy, 54 MICH. L. REV. 71, 
71–72 (1955) (noting that a partial strike is one where work activity and strike activity coincide). 
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argued that the Board should adopt for the sake of clarity and predictability in 
future cases.31 
An attorney from the OGC’s office arguing an intermittent strike case 
could have utilized the analysis and framework provided by the model brief to 
argue his or her case, and the NLRB accordingly could have easily adopted in 
full the proposed framework.32 The OGC, through the model brief, ultimately 
attempted to: (1) differentiate intermittent and partial strikes and (2) extend 
NLRA protection to instances involving multiple strikes.33 The OGC further 
suggested criteria for determining whether multiple strikes fall under NLRA 
protection, namely, if the strikes “(1) [] involve a complete cessation of work, 
and are not so brief and frequent that they are tantamount to work slowdowns; 
(2) they are not designed to impose permanent conditions of work, but rather 
are designed to exert economic pressure; and (3) the employer is made aware 
of the employees’ purpose in striking.”34 
Prior to the rescission of the model brief, adoption of the OGC’s framework 
would have cleared up a historically unsettled area of labor law, but it could have 
also presented new challenges for employers and employees alike.35 This Note 
argues that while the OGC’s test would have been an important step in clarifying 
this area of law, it may not have gone far enough toward protecting both em-
ployers and employees.36 Part I details the history of strike protection and inter-
mittent strikes in U.S. labor law, focusing on both employee and employer 
rights.37 Part II analyzes the OGC’s model brief, discussing how it attempts to 
clarify the current intermittent and partial strike jurisprudence.38 Part III discuss-
es the advantages and disadvantages of the OGC’s test, focusing on the harms 
employers would face, and the areas of ambiguity that remain which could have 
prevented the standard from being useful for employees involved in campaigns 
like OUR Walmart.39 Part III goes on to argue that the current or future OGC 
                                                                                                                           
 31 OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL OF THE NAT’L LABOR RELATIONS BD., BRIEF INSERT: INTER-
MITTENT STRIKES (Oct. 3, 2016) [hereinafter OGC Model Brief], http://hr.cch.com/ELD/Intermittent
StrikesInsert.pdf [https://perma.cc/JAT9-CUDQ]. 
 32 See id. at 1 (presenting the model brief as an alternative option for the Board to consider in 
deciding on the legality of a given intermittent strike); Lotito, supra note 21 (noting the OGC’s sug-
gestion of using the model brief as an alternative argument in intermittent strike adjudications). 
 33 See OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 2–3 (outlining the asserted goals of the model brief); 
Bultman, supra note 21 (noting the OGC’s goals in putting forward the model brief). 
 34 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 13. 
 35 See supra notes 29–34 and accompanying text. As discussed below, the framework, had it been 
adopted as written, could have left areas of ambiguity that both sides still would have had to navigate, 
presenting new challenges. See infra notes 223–231 and accompanying text. 
 36 See infra notes 41–267 and accompanying text. 
 37 See infra notes 41–118 and accompanying text. 
 38 See infra notes 119–196 and accompanying text. 
 39 See infra notes 197–267 and accompanying text. 
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should re-propose this framework with slight alterations that would make it truly 
beneficial for all parties.40 
I. HISTORIC TREATMENT OF INTERMITTENT AND OTHER  
“NON-TRADITIONAL” STRIKES 
In enacting the National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) in 1935, Con-
gress endeavored to protect employees’ freedom to organize, and in turn their 
right to strike.41 Employee organization under the NLRA was, and remains, 
crucial to maintaining a level playing field between employers’ and employees’ 
disparate bargaining power.42 Broadly stated, without freedom of organization, 
employees would likely be disregarded by their economically dominant em-
ployers when attempting to negotiate for better wages, hours, or working con-
ditions.43 For this reason, the right to strike or the ability to threaten a strike 
have been referred to as “indispensable parts of a national labor policy.”44 A 
strike, or threat of, is the most powerful and sometimes the only piece of lever-
age employees can bring to the bargaining table.45 
The NLRA also provides employers with their own set of rights.46 For ex-
ample, labor organizations cannot refuse to bargain with employers.47 Employ-
                                                                                                                           
 40 See infra notes 197–267 and accompanying text. 
 41 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012) (detailing the NLRA’s goal of promoting labor harmony, collective 
bargaining, and the balance of bargaining power); Id. § 163 (preserving the right to strike); Becker, 
supra note 22, at 352 (detailing the history of the National Labor Relations Act, specifically Con-
gress’s intent to create a fair system of collective bargaining based around the right to strike). 
 42 29 U.S.C. § 151; ROBERT A. GORMAN ET AL., COX AND BOK’S LABOR LAW CASES AND MA-
TERIALS 47 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 16th ed. 2016). 
 43 See Becker, supra note 22, at 352 (noting that the right to strike is crucial to furthering the 
Act’s intent of promoting negotiation between employers and employees). Becker also notes that the 
“specter” of the right to strike could be enough to force employers to the bargaining table. Id.; see also 
id. at 352–53 (detailing the history behind the NLRA’s enactment, specifically noting the unequal 
bargaining power between employers and employees at that time). 
 44 GORMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 47; see also NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 
233–34 (1963) (detailing how labor policy dictates that the right to strike must be preserved in order 
to further collective bargaining). In Erie Resistor, the Supreme Court noted that despite congressional 
changes to national labor policy, the right to strike has always been an area whose integrity has been 
preserved, underscoring congressional intent to preserve the right to strike. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 
U.S. at 234–35. 
 45 See Becker, supra note 22, at 352 (noting the historic power of the strike in the bargaining 
context). 
 46 See Lodge 76, 427 U.S. at 152–53 (noting that even when activities are afforded Section 7 
protection, employers have the option to either implement a lockout of employees or hire temporary 
replacement workers); Jasper Seating Co., 285 N.L.R.B. at 550–51 (noting an employer’s right to 
engage temporary replacement workers to maintain operations, without resolving to outright discharge 
of striking employees); Solo Cup Co., 114 N.L.R.B. at 133–34 (noting an employer’s right to dock 
pay during a strike). 
 47 29 U.S.C. § 158. 
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ers are permitted to temporarily withhold or deny employment via a lockout.48 
Employers can hire temporary or permanent replacement workers for striking 
employees, and in some instances can do the same for employees that the em-
ployer itself locked out.49 During unprotected strikes, which currently can in-
clude partial and intermittent strikes, employers can discharge employees.50 
Despite the NLRA’s explicit preservation of the right to strike, there has 
been a significant amount of change over time in both the mechanics of per-
missible strikes and how employers are able to respond.51 NLRB decisions and 
court decisions constantly attempt to maintain balance between employer and 
employee rights.52 Section A discusses the roots of employees’ right to strike 
and the differences between “traditional” and “non-traditional” strikes.53 Sec-
tion B details how the intermittent strike tactic has been inconsistently adjudi-
cated, resulting in the confusing doctrine in place today.54 
A. The Right to Strike and the NLRA: Concerted Activities  
as Negotiation Tactics 
The NLRA was created to balance the level of disparate bargaining power 
inherent in the employer-employee relationship, with the goal of minimizing 
disruptions to commerce.55 Prior to the NLRA, groups of employees working 
                                                                                                                           
 48 See Discriminating Against Employees Because of Their Union Activities or Sympathies (Sec-
tion 8(a)(3)), N.L.R.B. (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/whats-law/employers/
discriminating-against-employees-because-their-union [https://perma.cc/UWR5-FHR5] (noting that 
employers may lockout employees defensively in response to unprotected activity or offensively to 
exert economic pressure for bargaining purposes); Work Stoppages Frequently Asked Questions, BU-
REAU LAB. STAT. (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.bls.gov/wsp/wspfaq.htm [https://perma.cc/CV34-
WVWD]. 
 49 See Discriminating Against Employees Because of Their Union Activities or Sympathies, supra 
note 48 (noting that employers may hire temporary replacements during strikes or lawful lockouts and 
may hire permanent replacements during economic strikes). 
 50 See id. (noting employers’ right to continue business operations). 
 51 See Kate Andrias, The New Labor Law, 126 YALE L.J. 2, 21–23 (2016) (detailing strike law’s 
progression over time and how it was shaped by changing labor policies). 
 52 See id. at 21 (noting unions’ loss of economic power and subsequent attempts to balance em-
ployer and employee rights). 
 53 See infra notes 55–74 and accompanying text. 
 54 See infra notes 75–118 and accompanying text. 
 55 See 29 U.S.C. § 151 (discussing policy goals of the NLRA). When Senator Robert Wagner first 
introduced the bill that would become the NLRA in the Senate, it was titled the “Labor Disputes Act” 
and began by stating its express purpose “to equalize the bargaining power of employers and employ-
ees [and] encourage the amicable settlement of disputes . . . .” Labor Disputes Act, S. 2926, 73d Cong. 
(1934). The Act went on to note that labor strife causes unwelcome obstructions to commerce, and 
that balancing bargaining power could aid this malady. Id. Senator Wagner echoed this sentiment in 
his testimony before the Committee on Labor of the House of Representatives. Labor Disputes Act: 
Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the H. Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong. 8–25 (1935) (statement of Sen. 
Robert F. Wagner of New York). Senator Wagner notably argued, to applause, that the Act would 
“apply the healing balm of an upright, impartial, and peaceful forum to industry and labor, and thus 
will benefit employers, workers, and the country at large.” Id. at 25. 
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together to pursue better terms or conditions of employment could be prose-
cuted for criminal conspiracy or for anti-trust violations.56 This left employers 
with wide latitude to unilaterally promulgate terms and conditions that, in 
many instances, employees found unfavorable.57 The NLRA corrected this is-
sue by protecting employees’ rights to work together to achieve more benefi-
cial terms of employment.58 Section 7 of the NLRA affords employees the 
right to engage in “concerted activities” for purposes of collective bargaining 
or other mutual aid or protection.59 Under Section 8 of the NLRA, which gives 
teeth to Section 7, any action taken by an employer that interferes with this 
right constitutes an unfair labor practice and is subject to an injunction.60 
Strikes have long been recognized as a protected concerted activity.61 Moreo-
ver, employees’ rights to strike are specifically protected by Section 13 of the 
NLRA.62 
The term strike, as defined in the Labor-Management Relations Act, “in-
cludes any strike or other concerted stoppage of work by employees . . . and 
any concerted slowdown or other concerted interruption of operations by em-
ployees.”63 The right to strike itself has undergone decades of evolution, with 
case law, Congress, and the NLRB all playing roles in the economic tug of war 
between employers and employees.64 Strikes were already an established bar-
                                                                                                                           
 56 Loewe v. Lawlor, 208 U.S. 274, 293 (1908) (holding that the Sherman Anti-Trust Act prohibits 
any combination whatsoever that restricts the free flow of commerce between the states, including 
employees working in concert); Vegelahn v. Guntner, 167 Mass. 92, 97 (1896) (deciding the legality 
of an injunction preventing workers from picketing and referring to the two-man picket at issue as a 
conspiracy); Becker, supra note 22, at 358 (noting that prior to the NLRA engaging in a strike was 
criminal conspiracy). 
 57 Labor Disputes Act: Hearings on H.R. 6288 Before the H. Comm. on Labor, 74th Cong. 8–25 
(1935) (statement of Sen. Robert F. Wagner of New York) (detailing prior failed attempts to protect 
workers). 
 58 See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (protecting workers’ rights to engage in collective bargaining). 
 59 Id. The mutual aid or protection clause of Section 7 generally covers any activity related to 
employees’ terms and conditions of employment, regardless of whether employees are unionized. See 
Asplundh Tree Expert Co. v. NLRB, 365 F.3d 168, 172 n.3 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing NLRB v. Wash. 
Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9, 14 (1962)). 
 60 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), 160(j). 
 61 Becker, supra note 22, at 359 (noting congressional debates that make clear strikes were a type 
of protected concerted activity under the NLRA). 
 62 29 U.S.C. § 163 (preserving employees’ right to strike subject to enumerated exceptions). 
 63 Id. § 142(2). This definition has been whittled down over the years to exclude certain intermittent 
and partial strikes. See Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 14 (holding a walk-out to be unprotected 
under the Act); NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240, 256 (1939) (holding a sit-down 
strike to be unprotected under the Act); NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. 333, 343 (1938) 
(examining whether workers who strike remain employees of the company); Wesley Kennedy, Inter-
mittent Strikes: An Overview from the Union Perspective, 14 LAB. L. 117, 121–22 (1998) (noting that 
the Supreme Court has not explicitly defined the bounds of intermittent strike behavior, but acknowl-
edging that some partial and intermittent strikes fall outside NLRA protection). 
 64 See Michael H. LeRoy, Creating Order Out of Chaos and Other Partial and Intermittent 
Strikes, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 221, 225–28 (2000) (noting the key Supreme Court decisions, NLRB deci-
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gaining tool, though one without statutory protection, by the time the NLRA 
was enacted in 1935.65 Seen as an unwieldy tactic producing labor turmoil, 
NLRA architect Senator Robert Wagner designed the Act to control strikes, 
rather than outlaw them completely.66 Senator Wagner recognized strikes’ im-
portance in collective bargaining for workers who otherwise could be left 
powerless in the employer-employee relationship. 67 
Though disruptive, reserving the right to strike is often enough to bring 
employers to the bargaining table, fearing the social and economic conse-
quences of a work stoppage.68 The NLRA drafters preserved this right by codi-
fying employees’ right to be free from employer retaliation for participating in 
strikes and other concerted activities.69 In order to maintain balance, however, 
decisions interpreting the NLRA have regulated what employees can and can-
not do during a strike.70 Additionally, the Board grants employers some rights, 
such as the option to lock out workers who refuse to bargain and the ability to 
hire temporary or permanent replacements for striking employees.71 
As the Board, Congress and the court system attempted to balance em-
ployer and employee protections, intermittent strike law evolved into the 
murky doctrine it is today.72 Drawn-out traditional strikes, though protected, 
became economically unfeasible for employees, but the loss of the threat of a 
strike would have negative consequences for employees during bargaining.73 
                                                                                                                           
sions, and congressional enactments regarding intermittent strike law). LeRoy’s article details parts of 
the history of intermittent strike jurisprudence, noting how the amount of leverage oscillated between 
favoring employers and employees at various points. See id. 
 65 See id. at 228 (noting that the NLRA explicitly reserved employees’ right to strike); see also 
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443, 478 (1921) (holding a secondary boycott of an 
employer’s goods to be illegal); Vegelahn, 167 Mass. at 97 (holding a two-man picket to be an illegal 
conspiracy). 
 66 See LeRoy, supra note 64, at 228–29 (detailing the history leading up to the NLRA’s enact-
ment). 
 67 See id. at 228 (noting Senator Wagner’s reasons why he felt it was important to keep strikes as 
an available tactic for employees); see also NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180 
(1967) (explaining that labor policy is grounded on employees’ ability to organize, thereby strengthen-
ing their bargaining position). 
 68 See Atl. Scaffolding Co., 356 N.L.R.B. 835, 837 (2011) (discussing the potential economic 
harm an employer might face during a strike action); Joseph R. Landry, Note, Fair Responses to Un-
fair Labor Practices: Enforcing Federal Labor Law Through Nontraditional Forms of Labor Action, 
116 COLUM. L. REV. 147, 155 (2016) (noting that the threat of a strike is a powerful tool for unionized 
employees in collective bargaining talks with employers). 
 69 29 U.S.C. § 157; Kennedy, supra note 62, at 117 (noting the importance of the strike for em-
ployees). 
 70 Becker, supra note 22, at 353–54 (noting successions of restrictions placed on strike activities). 
 71 Discriminating Against Employees Because of Their Union Activities or Sympathies, supra 
note 48. 
 72 See Landry, supra note 68, at 149 (noting the ambiguity in current law as to when a strike is 
deserving of Act protection). 
 73 See id. (describing the typical prolonged strike action as one where work ceases completely, at 
times for months on end, and workers are left without paychecks and companies without production). 
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So despite the often-unclear issues of legality, employees have increasingly 
resorted to non-traditional strikes in labor disputes.74 
B. How Intermittent Strikes Fell into Ambiguity 
While the right to strike is broadly granted in statutory text, intermittent 
strikes currently sit in a zone of legal ambiguity.75 Case law and Board adjudi-
cation have generally marshaled strikes into one of three categories: (1) activi-
ty protected from employer retaliation under the NLRA, (2) unprotected activi-
ty, and (3) illegal activity.76 The overarching issue arose because when a 
strike’s form has been questioned—and thus, whether the strike is afforded 
NLRA protection—the NLRB has more often defined intermittent strikes in 
the negative rather than giving the term a clear and positive definition.77 Ac-
cordingly, intermittent strikes can fall into any of the above-mentioned catego-
ries based on the unique facts at hand, the political makeup of the NLRB, or 
the particular Federal Appeals Court hearing the appeal.78 
The notion that the right to strike came with an underlying qualifier, that 
certain forms of strikes did not receive NLRA protection, was first raised not 
long after the NLRA’s enactment, in the 1939 Supreme Court case NLRB v. 
                                                                                                                           
 74 See Bultman, supra note 21 (noting the increasing prevalence of short-term strikes). 
 75 29 U.S.C. § 163 (2012); Becker, supra note 22, at 356–57 (noting that it is accepted today that 
intermittent strikes are unprotected yet referring to two lines of cases that have conflicting holdings). 
 76 See Becker, supra note 22, at 379–81, 383 (describing the various strike forms and their legal 
implications). Generally, an “illegal” strike is one that can be enjoined by the NLRB or a state labor 
board. See id. at 381. An “unprotected” strike is one that employees can lawfully undertake, but they 
are not safeguarded from employer retaliation such as a discharge. See id. at 383. A “protected” strike 
is one within the bounds and protections of Section 7 of the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 163. 
 77 See Kennedy, supra note 63, at 121–22 (noting that since intermittent strikes were generally 
held to be unprotected, only a few cases have actually found activities that fall into that category). 
Kennedy cites three notable instances where activities were considered unprotected intermittent 
strikes. Id. For example, repeated refusal to perform overtime work, repeated attendance of union 
meetings, and repeated gathering in one spot every day to protest a work policy all fell under the in-
termittent strike category. Id. More often, Kennedy notes, cases endeavor to define activities that are 
not intermittent strikes. Id. at 122. 
 78 See Becker, supra note 22, at 382–83 (noting that the Supreme Court has yet to explicitly rule 
on the status of intermittent strikes, but has suggested conflicting classifications in dicta); Michael R. 
Feinberg & Henry M. Willis, Whose Strike Is It Anyway? Intermittent Strikes: What They are, When 
They Are Protected and How they Are Being Used in the “Fight for 15,” A.B.A. SECTION LAB. & 
EMP. L. 5 (Feb. 27, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/events/labor_law/2017/02/
dll/papers/whose%20strike%20is%20it%20anyway%20021717.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/
8NNE-ZSVH] (noting that politicization of the NLRB is a major hurdle to achieving protection of 
intermittent strikes). All five board members of the NLRB must participate in decisions that would 
reverse longstanding Board precedent. Feinberg & Willis, supra. Assuming President Trump appoints 
Republicans to Board vacancies, a majority Republican Board might be hesitant to extend protection 
to intermittent strikes. Id. 
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Fansteel Metallurgical Corp.79 The Fansteel Court recognized that certain 
forms of strikes are not only outside of the Act’s protection, but are even ille-
gal.80 In 1949, the Supreme Court expanded these restrictions to include other 
forms of strikes in International Union, Local 232 v. Wisconsin Employment 
Relations Board (referred to commonly and hereinafter as “Briggs & Stratton”), 
which allowed states to issue cease and desist orders in labor disputes.81 The 
Court backtracked slightly over the next few decades, and instead of declaring 
certain strikes to be illegal, the Court instead held non-traditional strikes to be 
unprotected, meaning employers could use self-help tactics in place of state 
action.82 The two major cases outlining this new doctrine are NLRB v. Insur-
ance Agents International Union and Lodge 76, International Ass’n of Machin-
ists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission.83 
The outcome of these cases, and others of the same kind, however, turned on 
their unique facts.84 Further, subsequent decisions relied on non-binding dicta 
to reach their holdings.85 Since Lodge 76, non-traditional strikes have fell into 
the amorphous non-protected but not illegal zone where they still find them-
selves today.86 
On the heels of the passage of the NLRA in 1935, employees undoubtedly 
had a general right to strike, but the outer bounds of this right had yet to be 
                                                                                                                           
 79 See Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 256 (holding a sit-in strike to be illegal); Becker, supra note 22, at 
368 (noting that Fansteel was one of the first cases to restrict strikes based on form); see also infra 
notes 87–92 and accompanying text (providing a detailed discussion of Fansteel). 
 80 See Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 256–57 (affirming refusal to uphold an order to reinstate workers 
where the underlying strike, a sit-in on the employer’s premises, was illegal); see also infra notes 87–
92 and accompanying (providing a detailed discussion of Fansteel). 
 81 See Briggs & Stratton, 336 U.S. at 256 (holding that the strikes at issue in the case were so 
egregious that they were “indefensible” under the Act). The Court relied on traditional notions of 
property law to distinguish the employees’ actions here. Id. When the employees refused to work but 
stayed on the premises, they were trespassing, and the Court did not want to condone that conduct. Id. 
at 355–56. See also infra notes 93–101 and accompanying text (providing a detailed discussion of 
Briggs & Stratton). 
 82 Becker, supra note 22, at 379–83 (following the progression of intermittent strike law jurispru-
dence from the 1930s to 1970s). 
 83 Lodge 76, 427 U.S. at 152; NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960). See 
infra notes 102–114 and accompanying text (providing a detailed discussion of Insurance Agents and 
Lodge 76). 
 84 See Becker, supra note 22, at 408 (alluding to the notion that the cases interpreting non-
traditional strikes are often fact-specific inquiries). 
 85 Id. at 413 (noting that aside from dicta, the Supreme Court has not come down one way or 
another on intermittent strikes’ legality). 
 86 Id. at 383 (noting that the NLRB has not clarified the ambiguous case law surrounding inter-
mittent strikes). Becker notes that the Supreme Court cases suggest the presence of an “intermediate 
category” where intermittent strikes are not illegal and not protected. Id. That is to say, the strikes are 
free from any governmental interference, but employers may also retaliate against striking employees. 
Id. 
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defined.87 Questions in need of answering included, among others, whether 
striking workers remained employees, what types of activities were “concert-
ed,” and, notably for intermittent strike jurisprudence, what types of strike be-
havior were protected by the NLRA.88 The 1939 Fansteel decision addressed 
the latter issue, and examined illegal strikes that were plainly outside the 
bounds of NLRA protection.89 While recognizing that Congress and the Wag-
ner Act expressly provided that nothing in the Act shall impede or diminish the 
right to strike, the Supreme Court read into the statute that Congress intended 
to address only lawful strikes.90 In other words, the Act’s affordance of the 
right to strike does not grant employees carte blanche to pursue any means of 
striking they see fit.91 And while the plainly contemplated purpose of a strike is 
to exert economic pressure, that pressure must be exerted using legal means.92 
The Supreme Court recycled the Fansteel reasoning a decade later in the 
1949 Briggs & Stratton decision, when the Court again addressed certain 
“non-traditional” strike tactics, this time a series of intermittent work stoppag-
es.93 In Briggs & Stratton, the Supreme Court held that the NLRA’s protection 
of strikes did not preempt a state labor board from ordering an end to a union’s 
practice of holding repeated unannounced meetings during normal business 
hours.94 The problem with this holding, as pointed out in the dissent, was that 
the Court relied on an unstable legal foundation.95 The Court simply equated 
                                                                                                                           
 87 See, e.g., Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. at 343 (examining whether workers who strike 
remain employees of the company); NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486, 491 (8th Cir. 
1946) (examining the motives of an employee strike and whether the motives of a strike can affect its 
status under the Act). 
 88 See, e.g., Wash. Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. at 14 (examining whether a walk-out was protected 
under the Act); Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 247 (examining whether a sit-down strike was protected under 
the Act); Mackay Radio & Tel. Co., 304 U.S. at 343 (examining whether workers who strike remain 
employees of the company). 
 89 Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 244. The employees in this case conducted a sit-down or sit-in strike, 
wherein they ceased working but stayed at their positions, presumably with the goal of grinding the 
employer’s operations to a halt. Id. at 244–50. In holding that this was not protected behavior, the 
Supreme Court emphasized the illegality of the action. Id. at 263–64. The employees were trespassing, 
as they had been discharged once they began their strike. Id. For that reason, the Supreme Court ulti-
mately refused to uphold an injunction ordering the company to rehire the workers and provide back 
pay. Id. 
 90 See id. at 256 (affirming refusal to uphold an injunction where the underlying strike was ille-
gal). 
 91 See id. (holding that an illegal act is not the “exercise of the ‘right to strike’ to which the 
[NLRA] refer[s]”). 
 92 See id. (holding that illegal actions cannot receive NLRA protection). 
 93 See Briggs & Stratton, 336 U.S. at 264–65 (“[T]his Court . . . has said, . . . ‘[the] recognition of 
the ‘right to strike’ plainly contemplates a lawful strike—the exercise of the unquestioned right to quit 
work,’ and it did not operate to legalize the sit-down strike, which state law made illegal and state 
authorities punished.”). 
 94 See id. (holding that a state labor board can act in areas where the Act and the law are silent). 
 95 See id. at 269 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the activities at issue here are the exact 
type of activities deserving of Section 7 protection); Becker, supra note 22, at 378 (noting that the 
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the intermittent strikes at hand to the sit-down strikes banned in Fansteel, and 
noted that Fansteel stands for the proposition that not all strike activity is al-
lowable.96 The Fansteel Court, however, did not allow the sit-in strikes be-
cause they found them to be illegal.97 Briggs & Stratton went a step further by 
saying that, while this activity was not illegal, it is not a type of strike activity 
deserving of NLRA protection.98 In creating this new ambiguous middle-
ground category, however, without expounding on when, how, or why the be-
havior crossed the line, the Court unintentionally added a measure of subjec-
tive analysis to a strike’s legality without providing guiding criteria.99 It also 
gave employers grounds to lawfully dismiss employees for engaging in similar 
conduct.100 Ultimately, the decision ended up standing for the general proposi-
tion that employers may be able to take self-help measures in response to an 
intermittent strike.101 
Eleven years later, as some of the Briggs & Stratton dissenters’ warnings 
came to fruition, the Court revisited intermittent strikes in Insurance Agents.102 
                                                                                                                           
Court’s decision in Briggs & Stratton was largely made without prior legal decisions on which to 
rely). 
 96 See Briggs & Stratton, 336 U.S. at 256, 259 (holding that the strikes at issue in the case were so 
egregious that they were “indefensible” under the Act); Becker, supra note 22, at 378 (noting that the 
only rationale the Court offered was that the strike at issue was “indefensible”). The Harnischfeger 
Corp. NLRB decision gave rise to the “indefensible” line of reasoning when the Board asked: “The 
question before us is, we think, whether this particular [strike] activity was so indefensible, under the 
circumstances, as to warrant the respondent, under the Act, in discharging the stewards for this type of 
union activity.” Harnischfeger Corp., 9 N.L.R.B. 676, 686 (1938). 
 97 See Fansteel, 306 U.S. at 256 (affirming refusal to uphold an injunction where the underlying 
strike was illegal because the striking employees were trespassing on the employer’s property). 
 98 See Briggs & Stratton, 336 U.S. at 264–65. The Court noted the dangers of allowing any form 
of strike activity. Id. at 264. The employees’ interpretation of the law would have made “strike[s] an 
absolute right . . . the effect [of which] would be to legalize beyond the power of any state or federal 
authorities to control” any form of strike, a simply untenable result in the Court’s opinion. Id. The 
Court compromised by suggesting that there is strike activity not explicitly authorized by legislation 
on the books, but also not illegal. Id. at 264–65. 
 99 See Becker, supra note 22, at 377 (criticizing the Court’s failure to explain why intermittent 
stoppages are to be treated comparably as the sit-in strikes in Fansteel). Becker notes that the decision 
has been wrongly cited for the proposition that employers can discharge intermittent strikers. Id. In 
fact, Becker writes, the Court explicitly noted the absence of employer retaliatory measures in the 
case, and therefore did not approve or disapprove of them. Id. at 377 & n.121. 
 100 Id. at 377. 
 101 Id. at 377, 380 (noting that the Briggs & Stratton decision is too often erroneously cited for the 
proposition that employers can fire intermittent strikers without legal consequence, and arguing that 
the Briggs & Stratton Court did not explicitly hold as such). 
 102 See Ins. Agents, 361 U.S. at 492–94, 500 (holding a strike injunction to be invalid due to 
NLRA’s misplaced regulation of the activity). The Court in Insurance Agents examined whether the 
NLRB had the same authority as afforded to the state labor board in Briggs & Stratton, that is, wheth-
er the NLRB could issue an injunction of strike activity. Id. The Court ultimately held that the Board 
could not enjoin this strike behavior, and cited the rationale that the employer had their own self-help 
methods they could rely on. Id. The argument over which law governs these types of strikes, however, 
likely could have been well-settled had the dissent won the day in Briggs & Stratton. See Briggs & 
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The Court scaled back from its decision in Briggs & Stratton by holding that 
intermittent strikes are not illegal, and therefore, not ripe for cease and desist 
orders.103 The Court also, however, suggested in dicta that employers could 
rightfully discharge intermittently striking employees.104 This decision directly 
led to the current legally ambiguous status of intermittent strikes.105 They are 
not illegal but they are not protected.106 Moreover, in Insurance Agents and 
cases that followed, the Court did not endeavor to set the bounds of this cate-
gory of strike.107 Striking employees have little guidance on what types of ac-
tivities are protected outside of a “full on” or “traditional” strike, which types 
of strikes are illegal, and which are neither subject to injunction nor fully pro-
tected.108 
In the most recent landmark case on the subject, Lodge 76, the Supreme 
Court confirmed the “legal no-man’s land” status of intermittent strikes.109 
First and foremost, Lodge 76 overruled Briggs & Stratton’s holding that non-
traditional strikes are illegal by holding that a strike, regardless of form, should 
be free from government intervention.110 Second, the Court approved of and 
                                                                                                                           
Stratton, 336 U.S. at 268 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the activities in the case at hand fell 
within the ambit of Section 7 of the NLRA, and therefore should have been governed by federal law); 
id. at 270 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s decision departs from the usual defer-
ence given to administrative agencies). 
 103 See Ins. Agents, 361 U.S. at 493–94 (holding that partial strikes are unprotected under the 
NLRA, but not illegal, and therefore not subject to a cease and desist demand). The Court here also 
reasoned that Congress did not leave this question open for NLRB interpretation, and therefore the 
NLRB could not act in this area. Id. at 499–500. While the Board is free to regulate strikes that clearly 
fall under their purview, areas in which they do not have authority must be left alone. Id. 
 104 Id. at 490; Becker, supra note 22, at 379–80. Key to the decision was the Court’s feeling that 
the Board did not have statutory authority to enjoin the strike. Becker, supra note 22, at 380. Indeed, 
the Court called the Board’s regulation of work stoppages an “intrusion into the substantive aspects of 
the bargaining process.” Ins. Agents, 361 U.S. at 490. Such intrusion would give the Board too much 
power to dictate what types of tactics may be used during collective bargaining. Id. 
 105 See Becker, supra note 22, at 381 (noting that this line of cases led to the ambiguous middle 
ground at issue here). 
 106 Id. Becker notes that through the Insurance Agents decision, the Supreme Court confirmed the 
existence of a “middle category of unprotected strikes” where the employees cannot be enjoined but 
they also do not enjoy NLRA protection. Id. This would seem antithetical to labor law policy in that it 
allows for a great deal of gray area. Id. 
 107 Ins. Agents, 361 U.S. at 490 (recognizing hesitance to regulating specific areas of the collec-
tive bargaining process). 
 108 Becker, supra note 22, at 383 (noting the absence of guidance on when a recurrent strike be-
comes an intermittent one, and what the legal implications of that distinction may ultimately be). 
 109 See Lodge 76, 427 U.S. at 152–53 (distinguishing protected and unprotected activity); see also 
Becker, supra note 22, at 381 (arguing that the Lodge 76 decision entrenched the status of intermittent 
strikes into a “legal no-man’s land between prohibition and protection”). Lodge 76 overruled the 
Briggs & Stratton decision, meaning that state labor boards could not issue injunctions and enter into 
collective bargaining disputes when intermittent strikes were at issue. Id. 
 110 Lodge 76, 427 U.S. at 141. The Court noted that decisions since Briggs & Stratton have reex-
amined the overarching issue, and further noted that strike activities need not be explicitly authorized 
by Section 7 in order to be free from interference, but rather, some activities engaged in as part of the 
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reiterated the dicta from Insurance Agents, that in the case of non-traditional 
strikes, employers are free to resort to retaliatory measures.111 For example, 
employers could hire replacements or lockout their intermittently striking em-
ployees without adverse legal consequences.112 Taken together, these two 
propositions now stand to differentiate strikes by form, protecting “traditional” 
strikes while leaving partial and intermittent “non-traditional” strikes devoid of 
NLRA protection.113 Most problematic is that this body of case law has failed 
to expound why this distinction ought to exist, and failed to draw a clear line 
delineating the two categories.114 
Adding to the uncertainty created by the Supreme Court’s adjudication of 
intermittent strike cases, the NLRB has also failed to outline specific defini-
tional criteria, opting to outline activities that are not unprotected intermittent 
strikes, rather than to explicitly define what are unprotected intermittent 
strikes.115 This was the case in early 2016 when the Board ruled on one of the 
OUR Walmart protests, ruling that their activity was protected and that 
Walmart’s subsequent discipline of the workers was an unfair labor practice.116 
Operating in such conditions simply creates uncertainty on both sides of the 
bargaining table.117 A group of employees cannot reliably predict “how far is 
too far” when planning a strike or series of strikes, and an employer has no 
way of knowing what sorts of activities it does not have to tolerate.118 
                                                                                                                           
collective bargaining process ought to simply fall outside of government regulation so long as they are 
conducive to collective bargaining. Id. 
 111 Id. at 140. 
 112 Id. at 152. Citing Insurance Agents, the Court noted that the employer was free to engage in 
retaliatory methods such as discharge or other action against striking employees. Id. 
 113 Id. The Lodge 76 Court noted the difference between forms of strikes and cited the form as a 
reason why the employers were free to resort to self-help methods. Id. 
 114 Becker, supra note 22, at 383. 
 115 See Kennedy, supra note 63, at 121–22 (listing the few Board decisions since Lodge 76 that 
have endeavored to affirmatively address what constitutes intermittent strike activities, and noting the 
Board more often merely defines the term in the negative). 
 116 Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 1 (Aug. 27, 2016). The Board ultimately held 
that, because the protest was “small, brief, peaceful, and confined,” the employees did not lose protec-
tion. Id. at 7. The Board did not, however, analyze the strike so fully as to make it clear which factors 
would have led to an opposite outcome. See supra notes 1–7 and accompanying text (providing the 
factual details of the strike). 
 117 See Hutcheson, supra note 25, at 2–4 (noting how, in the Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. case before the 
NLRB, both Walmart and the employees noted the need for clarity in intermittent strike adjudication); 
Michael M. Oswalt, Improvisational Unionism, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 597, 603 (2016) (noting the legal 
uncertainty surrounding the rise of the new non-union labor movements). 
 118 See Hutcheson, supra note 25, at 1–4 (noting the unpredictability of intermittent strike adjudi-
cation and using Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. as a case study). 
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II. THE OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL OF THE NLRB SEEKS  
NEEDED CLARITY IN INTERMITTENT STRIKE DOCTRINE 
In an effort to end the inconsistent treatment intermittent strikes have re-
ceived since Lodge 76, the OGC of the NLRB had sought clarification on the 
intermittent strike doctrine.119 This guidance is necessary for both employers 
and employees.120 The current doctrine is plainly confusing and difficult to 
apply, and often results in contradictions or unjust results.121 As unionization 
rates and instances of traditional strikes decline across the United States, in-
termittent strikes, like the ones at Walmart, have increased in prevalence.122 
Intermittent strikes are quickly becoming an important, and sometimes only, 
option in the aggrieved employee’s bargaining toolkit.123 Section A considers 
why intermittent strikes are significant in today’s labor climate, specifically 
examining the impact of declining unionization.124 Section B reviews the rise 
of non-union concerted activities such as OUR Walmart and Fight for 15, and 
explains why intermittent strike protection is necessary for any future success-
es these movements may have.125 Section C examines recent instances of in-
termittent strike jurisprudence.126 Section D introduces the OGC’s now-
rescinded framework for future adjudication of intermittent strikes and details 
how it could have clarified the doctrine and the impact it could have had on 
employers and employees.127 
                                                                                                                           
 119 Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisc. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 
427 U.S. 132 (1976); Young, supra note 21 (noting the rescission of OM Memorandum 17-02, the 
model brief regarding intermittent strikes); General Counsel Asks NLRB to Change Intermittent Strike 
Law, supra note 12. 
 120 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 3 (arguing that ambiguity in this area is a negative for 
both employers and employees); General Counsel Asks NLRB to Change Intermittent Strike Law, 
supra note 12 (noting that employees are subject to employer discharge for activities they may have 
otherwise thought were protected activities). 
 121 See OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 3 (noting inconsistent results); Becker, supra note 22, 
at 376. 
 122 See OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 2 (noting the increase in intermittent strike activity); 
Oswalt, supra note 117, at 603 (noting how campaigns like OUR Walmart are changing worker or-
ganization strategies); infra notes 135–141 and accompanying text (detailing figures from the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics outlining declining unionization rates in the United States). 
 123 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 3 (noting the increase in intermittent strikes and their 
importance as a viable labor tactic). 
 124 See infra notes 128–141 and accompanying text. 
 125 See infra notes 142–166 and accompanying text. 
 126 See infra notes 167–180 and accompanying text. 
 127 See infra notes 181–196 and accompanying text. 
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A. The Shift from Traditional to Non-Traditional Strikes  
and Why Intermittent Strikes Are Necessary 
The OGC cited two main reasons why non-traditional worker movements 
must rely on intermittent strikes.128 First, non-union workers often lack the 
proper mechanisms or grievance procedures to deal with problems in the 
workplace and are turning to short-term strikes to put maximum pressure on 
employers.129 Second, given diminishing union affiliation, such workers do not 
have access to the same financial backing union members would, and therefore 
simply cannot afford drawn out strike efforts.130 In an increasingly non-
unionized labor market, employees cannot garner the same strength in numbers 
on which they used to rely.131 Striking employees are less impactful without 
large numbers.132 Employees must instead increasingly rely on factors like tim-
ing and media coverage to exert the same type of pressure that, for example, a 
month long strike would exert.133 In attempting to clarify intermittent strike 
doctrine, the OGC attempted to reintroduce the strike back into the employee’s 
bargaining arsenal and equalize the employer-employee relationship the way 
recognition of concerted activities once did.134 
In 1983 the Bureau of Labor Statistics (“BLS”) reported 17.7 million U.S. 
workers were unionized—or 20.1% of wage and salaried workers.135 In 2017 
that figure was down to 14.8 million members, or 10.7%.136 Unionized work-
                                                                                                                           
 128 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 14. 
 129 Id.; Shelly Banjo & Melanie Trottman, Wal-Mart Challenges Labor Board’s Complaint, 
WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/walmart-challenges-labor-board8217s-
complaint-1391389153 [https://perma.cc/F6QJ-2EHH] (noting that short-term strikes are changing the 
labor landscape in the absence of traditional labor unions); Victor Luckerson, The One Day Strike: 
The New Labor Weapon of Last Resort, TIME (Dec. 7, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/12/07/the-
one-day-strike-the-new-labor-weapon-of-last-resort [https://perma.cc/FN59-THLU] (discussing 
strikes in over 100 cities and noting that the strikes involved a series of intermittent one-day protests). 
Luckerson also notes that the falling unionization rates have coincided with a decrease in “traditional” 
strikes, and argues that one-day strikes may be the only viable option remaining. Luckerson, supra. 
 130 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 14; see infra notes 135–141 and accompanying text (de-
tailing figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics outlining declining unionization rates in the United 
States). 
 131 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 3 (noting the increase in intermittent strikes and their 
importance as a viable labor tactic); Oswalt, supra note 117, at 599. 
 132 See OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 3 (noting the increase in intermittent strikes and their 
importance as a viable labor tactic); Oswalt, supra note 117, at 599 (noting the decreasing importance 
of the strike as a bargaining tactic, in part due to declining unionization figures). 
 133 See Andrias, supra note 51, at 50 (noting the importance of social media in raising awareness 
for worker movements); Jamieson, supra note 8 (detailing Black Friday protests). 
 134 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 12–15. 
 135 Union Members–2017: Union Membership (Annual) News Release, DEP’T LAB., BUREAU LAB. 
STAT. (Jan. 19, 2018), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf [https://perma.cc/QZV3-GEX6]. 
 136 Id. 
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ers earned an average of about $212 more per week than non-union workers.137 
Work stoppage figures have seen an even more drastic drop in frequency.138 
The BLS defines a “work stoppage” as a strike including 1,000 or more work-
ers lasting at least one full shift.139 In 2017 there were only seven such work 
stoppages.140 This represents a 90% drop in work stoppages over the previous 
four decades.141 
B. OUR Walmart and Fight for 15 Currently Rely on Intermittent  
Strikes in the Absence of Unionization 
Despite pronounced recognition in some academic circles that re-
empowering unionization would have a net beneficial effect on workers, the 
economy, and income inequality, many workers cannot afford to wait for a un-
ion renaissance that may or may not be on the horizon.142 This has led workers 
to bargain outside of a traditional union structure.143 Two such examples are 
OUR Walmart and Fight for 15.144 
                                                                                                                           
 137 Id. The reader should note, however, that the Bureau of Labor Statistics warns that earnings 
comparisons may not account for potentially important factors that would explain the differences 
between the figures. Id. 
 138 Work Stoppages Summary, DEP’T LAB., BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Feb. 9, 2018), https://www.bls.
gov/news.release/wkstp.nr0.htm [https://perma.cc/T2W2-F8RF]. 
 139 Work Stoppages: Frequently Asked Questions, DEP’T LAB., BUREAU LAB. STAT. (Apr. 27, 
2016), https://www.bls.gov/wsp/wspfaq.htm# [https://perma.cc/PNG5-SM4G]. 
 140 Work Stoppages Summary, supra note 138. 
 141 Id. From 1947 to 1956, for example, the United States saw 3,438 work stoppages. Id. Six decades 
later, from 2007 to 2016, that figure was 143. Id. The parallel sharp declines in union membership and 
work stoppages are no coincidence. See Andrias, supra note 51, at 21–23 (arguing that without union 
membership, strike actions are an increasingly daunting proposition for smaller groups of employees). 
Case law expanding employer rights gave employers both the ability to avoid unionization of their 
workers and also make strikes economically unviable for workers. Id. Employers, for example, can 
close a unionized plant and hire subcontractors. Id. at 22. Declining membership leaves unions less 
powerful and corporations therefore are less hesitant about finding replacements and “strike breakers.” 
Mike Collins, The Decline of Unions Is a Middle Class Problem, FORBES (Mar. 19, 2015), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/mikecollins/2015/03/19/the-decline-of-unions-is-a-middle-class-problem/ 
[https://perma.cc/PB2E-DQQ3]. 
 142 See Andrias, supra note 51, at 44 (detailing attempts to revive unionization in the United 
States); Oswalt, supra note 117, at 603 (arguing that the union-movement’s energy needs to be redi-
rected); Dayne Lee, Note, Bundling “Alt-Labor”: How Policy Reform Can Facilitate Political Organ-
ization in Emerging Worker Movements, 51 HARV. C.R.-C.R. L. REV. 509, 516 (2016) (noting the rise 
of alternative forms of organization in response to declining unionization); Collins, supra note 141 
(noting the historic importance of unions and economic problems stemming from their declining 
rates). 
 143 See Lee, supra note 142, at 516 (describing “alt-labor” movements as groups outside tradi-
tional bargaining units that are self-organized but nonetheless funded by large worker organizations). 
 144 Andrias, supra note 51, at 50–51 (noting the rise of worker-based campaigns outside the 
NLRA model of union-based bargaining). 
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OUR Walmart has designed a campaign based on exerting public pressure 
rather than traditional bargaining.145 At the heart of the campaign are one-day 
walkouts on notable commercial days such as Black Friday.146 For a small la-
bor movement such as OUR Walmart, one-day efforts can raise public and me-
dia awareness without forcing participants to sacrifice days of wages or even 
their jobs.147 For its part, Walmart believes that such strikes do not and should 
not receive NLRA protection.148 In support of its contention, Walmart cites the 
substantial problems these tactics pose for its operations and its ability to serve 
customers and the burdens imposed on non-striking employees who are forced 
to pick up the slack of their co-workers.149 
An employee strike does not mean an employer’s operations can or 
should grind to a halt.150 A strike may be just as effective for employees when 
an employer is faced with the economic and operational burden of training re-
placement workers and reassigning remaining employees, and this is not even 
taking into account the media scrutiny strikes tend to attract.151 With intermit-
tent strikes, however, employers such as Walmart assert that their rights, such 
as the right to hire replacements, are being bulldozed.152 Hiring and training 
replacement workers for one or two days is impractical at best and economi-
cally agonizing at worst.153 Accordingly, Walmart has terminated and disci-
                                                                                                                           
 145 See Jamieson, supra note 9 (detailing very public campaigns against Walmart, including Black 
Friday strikes). 
 146 See Jamieson, supra note 8 (noting three consecutive years of protests on Black Friday by 
Walmart workers across the United States); Kieler, supra note 8. 
 147 See Jamieson, supra note 9. Such tactics have been likened to guerilla warfare, and have gar-
nered beneficial media attention, shedding light on OUR Walmart’s mission. Oswalt, supra note 117, at 
599–600 (explaining how social media helped rally support and draw attention to the strikes). 
 148 See Rosenfeld, supra note 21 (noting Walmart’s opposition to the unfair labor practice charges 
filed against it). 
 149 See id. Walmart’s Attorney, Steven Wheeless, noted that, “Walmart does not believe Congress 
created intermittent strike leave to serve as a prop for union campaign messaging at the expense of 
customer service, operational efficiency, and the co-workers who have to cover for employees who 
intermittently come and go from their scheduled shifts at a union’s bidding.” Id. 
 150 The Right to Strike, NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD, (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.nlrb.gov/strikes 
[https://perma.cc/29C8-HW7V] (listing employer’s rights when employees go on strike). 
 151 Jeffrey M. Place, Hot Desert Winds Never Cease . . . or Do They? Intermittent Strikes: What 
They Are, When They Are Protected and How They Are Being Used in the “Fight for 15,” COMMIT-
TEE ON DEV. L. UNDER NLRA 17 (Feb. 27. 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
events/labor_law/2017/02/dll/mw2017dll_agenda.authcheckdam.pdf [https://perma.cc/8EVU-Y3P9] 
(noting that training replacements is a significant burden on employers); Jamieson, supra note 8 (de-
tailing Black Friday protests); Kieler, supra note 8 (detailing additional strikes). 
 152 See Rosenfeld, supra note 21 (detailing the Walmart counterargument to the unfair labor prac-
tice claims). 
 153 Jonathan J. Spitz et al., ‘Fight for $15’ Walk-Outs and Protests Continue; Are You Prepared 
for November 10?, JACKSON LEWIS (Nov. 6, 2015) http://www.jacksonlewis.com/publication/fight-
15-walk-outs-and-protests-continue-are-you-prepared-november-10 [https://perma.cc/2FHX-ZAME] 
(advising employers on the many courses of actions they can take when employees strike). 
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plined workers for engaging in such tactics, leading the workers, in turn, to file 
unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB.154 
Walmart is not the only employer currently walking this legal tightrope.155 
The fast food industry is also seeing its fair share of labor turmoil, most nota-
bly spearheaded by the “Fight for 15” campaign.156 Fight for 15 seeks to raise 
the minimum wage to $15 dollars for fast food workers and is mainly spear-
headed by McDonald’s employees.157 Similar to OUR Walmart, Fight for 15 is 
using intermittent strikes, often pre-arranged with a defined plan to return to 
work, in place of longer, more widespread traditional strikes.158 Also resem-
bling OUR Walmart, Fight for 15 is economically supported and advised by a 
traditional union, the Service Employees International Union, without being a 
formal member thereof.159 In a recent example of their activities, on November 
29, 2016, Fight for 15 members planned and operated one of their most wide-
spread strikes to date, organizing a one day strike across multiple industries 
and multiple states.160 Some protestors faced police discipline for their ac-
tions—many others awaited potential consequences from their employers.161 
Similar to Walmart’s dealings with OUR Walmart, McDonald’s has had to nav-
igate the opaque intermittent strike law while responding to the surging Fight 
                                                                                                                           
 154 Rosenfeld, supra note 21. 
 155 See Jamieson, supra note 9; Place, supra note 151, at 2 (detailing a walk-out at a Subway 
sandwich shop). 
 156 See, e.g., Jamieson, supra note 9 (detailing campaigns against McDonald’s). 
 157 See Jamieson, supra note 9; Place, supra note 151, at 2 (detailing an employee walk-out at a 
Subway sandwich shop). 
 158 Al Neal, The Power of the One-Day Strike, PEOPLE’S WORLD (Oct. 13, 2016), http://www.
peoplesworld.org/article/the-power-of-the-one-day-strike/ [https://perma.cc/V468-MELP]. 
 159 Spitz et al., supra note 153. 
 160 Juliette Dryer, Austin Fast Food Workers Strike as Part of ‘Fight for $15,’ CBS AUSTIN (Nov. 
29, 2016), http://keyetv.com/news/local/austin-fast-food-workers-strike-as-part-of-fight-for-15 
[https://perma.cc/C68Q-EDSZ] (describing protests in Austin, TX); Anthony Kurzweil et al., ‘Fight 
for 15’ Protesters Taken into Custody After Blocking Downtown L.A. Intersection, KTLA, (Nov. 29, 
2016), http://ktla.com/2016/11/29/fight-for-15-protesters-march-outside-downtown-l-a-mcdonalds/ 
[https://perma.cc/J49S-FJSU] (describing Fight for 15 protests in Los Angeles, CA); Jay Scott Smith, 
Demonstrators Go Inside McDonald’s, Tell Workers to Go on Strike Right Now, WHYY PHILA. (Nov. 
29, 2016), https://whyy.org/articles/demonstrators-go-inside-mcdonalds-tell-workers-to-go-on-strike-
right-now/ [https://perma.cc/NQ4Q-9WNM] (describing Fight for 15 protests in Philadelphia, PA); 
Sam Thielman, Fight for 15 Plans ‘Most Disruptive’ Wage Protest and Strike After Thanksgiving, 
GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/21/fight-for-15-protest-
strike-thanksgiving-trump [https://perma.cc/U3GU-SPET] (noting that protests could take place at 
twenty different airports). 
 161 Lisa Baertlien & Timothy McLaughlin, Scores Arrested in First ‘Fight for $15’ Protest Since 
Trump Win, REUTERS (Nov. 29, 2016), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-wages-protests-idUS
KBN13O0M8 [https://perma.cc/QXB6-DNL4] (noting dozens of arrests in New York City, Cam-
bridge, Detroit, and Los Angeles); ‘Fight for $15’ Protests Sweeping the Country, CBS NEWS (Nov. 
29, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/fight-for-15-minimum-wage-protests-chicago-ohare-nyc-la-
boston/ [https://perma.cc/J4QH-UKX4] (noting as many as twenty-five people arrested during a min-
imum wage protest). In these instances, protestors were arrested for blocking streets. Baertlien & 
McLaughlin, supra; ‘Fight for $15’ Protests Sweeping the Country, supra. 
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for 15 campaign, responding to a slew of unfair labor practice charges for dis-
ciplining striking workers.162 
Walmart, McDonald’s, and other massive corporations have a distinct ad-
vantage when an employee files an unfair labor practice charge in the wake of 
discipline stemming from an intermittent strike: the employers have the re-
sources to drag the cases out in front of the NLRB and in subsequent ap-
peals.163 They can take advantage of the vague intermittent strike law and flex 
their economic muscle to stall negotiations, often times to the effect of main-
stream media losing interest in the case, thus avoiding the type of negative 
public relations on which intermittent strikes depend.164 Perhaps even worse 
from the employee perspective, the employee may have unknowingly partici-
pated in an activity falling outside of Section 7 protection, leaving them devoid 
of the rights they thought they were exercising.165 Almost any employee knows 
they have a right to strike, but narrowing down what types of strikes are pro-
tected by Section 7 is currently a difficult task, especially for nonunionized 
employees who face well-prepared employers.166 
C. Recent Instances of Intermittent Strike Adjudication 
In the absence of a clear-cut framework for adjudicating intermittent 
strikes, the NLRB currently applies standards from murky case law on an ad 
                                                                                                                           
 162 Baertlien & McLaughlin, supra note 161 (describing a few of the unfair labor practice cases 
filed against McDonald’s); ‘Fight for 15’ Campaign to Target McDonald’s Stores April 14, CHI. 
TRIB. (Mar. 30, 2016), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-fight-for-15-campaign-mcdonalds-
20160330-story.html [https://perma.cc/AV7J-PMWF] (detailing labor disputes between McDonald’s 
and Fight for 15); ‘Fight for $15’ Protests Sweeping the Country, supra note 161 (detailing a number 
of the strikes involving McDonald’s employees). 
 163 See Becker, supra note 22, at 353 (noting that economic factors have lessened the strike’s 
impact); Spitz et al., supra note 153 (detailing steps an employer can take when employees strike). 
 164 See Becker, supra note 22, at 353 (noting the leverage employers have over employees); Spitz 
et al., supra note 153 (describing employer’s rights during employee strikes). 
 165 See Schwartz, supra note 20 (noting employees’ difficulties in determining which activities 
are protected and which are unprotected). 
 166 See Olney, supra note 14 (noting the difficulties non-union employees face in organizing organi-
cally). In the early parts of the OUR Walmart and Fight for 15 campaigns, an outpouring of guidance 
from labor blogs and academics sought to clarify intermittent strike law. See, e.g., Timothy J. Ryan et al., 
Fight for 15: Your Non-Union Employees Have Walked Out. Now What?, JACKSON LEWIS (Sept. 12, 
2014), http://www.jacksonlewis.com/resources-publication/fight-fifteen-your-non-union-employees-
have-walked-out-now-what [https://perma.cc/ZLB3-RHZJ] (noting that, whether or not a union is 
involved, walkouts may be protected concerted activity); Anne R. Yuengert, Can Your Non-Union 
Workers Strike? Yes, They Can, LAB. & EMP. INSIGHTS (Jan. 28, 2016), https://www.employmentlaw
insights.com/2016/01/can-your-non-union-workers-strike-yes-they-can/ [https://perma.cc/CCE3-
E2GV] (listing various rights afforded to employees not affiliated with a traditional union); Non-
Union Employees Have the Right to Strike, SHAWE ROSENTHAL LLP (Mar. 31, 2014), https://
www.employmentlawalliance.com/firms/shawe/articles/shawe-rosenthal-march-2014-e-update 
[https://perma.cc/G76T-KAUG] (summarizing an NLRB decision which reaffirmed non-union em-
ployees’ right to strike). 
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hoc basis to decide whether certain activities constitute unprotected intermit-
tent strikes.167 One such recent example was the NLRB’s 2017 decision in 
EYM King of Missouri, LLC.168 In EYM King, employees of a Burger King 
franchise filed an unfair labor practice claim following discipline related to 
work stoppages.169 The employer hinged their argument that they did not 
commit an unfair labor practice on the fact that the discipline was in response 
to an allegedly unprotected one-day strike.170 While again affirming that in-
termittent and partial strikes fall outside the bounds of NLRA protection, the 
Board here found the one-day work stoppage was not an intermittent strike.171 
The Board cited a series of cases all broadly defining what an intermittent 
strike is and then comparatively analyzed the employees’ actions in the case at 
hand.172 In sum, the Board wrote that lawfulness of these types of strikes turn 
on: “frequency and timing, whether the strikes were part of a common plan, 
whether there was Union involvement, whether the strikes were intended to 
harass the employer into a state of chaos, whether the strikes were for distinct 
acts of the employer, and whether the alleged discriminatees intended to reap 
the benefits of strike action without assuming the vulnerabilities of a forthright 
and continuous strike,” but also noted that each one of these prongs contain 
exemptions and limitations.173 After reviewing the one-day strike against these 
factors, the Board ultimately held that the conduct did not amount to an inter-
mittent strike and was instead protected concerted activity.174 
                                                                                                                           
 167 Becker, supra note 22, at 413 (noting the absence of predictability in current case law). 
 168 EYM King of Mo., LLC, 365 N.L.R.B. No. 16, at 1 (Jan. 24, 2017). 
 169 Id. at 3. A Burger King employee was disciplined for engaging in campaigns for better wages, 
hours, and working conditions. Id. At the heart of the issue was the employee’s participation in a 
number of brief strikes, only one of which spanned more than one day. Id. 
 170 Id. at 10 (noting the employer’s contention that employees should be subjected to discipline 
because their actions constituted an unprotected intermittent strike). 
 171 Id. at 14. 
 172 Id. at 11–14 (citing Farley Candy Co., 300 N.L.R.B. 849, 849 (1990)) (holding that intermit-
tent strikes involve an express plan to strike, return to work, and strike again); Audubon Health Care 
Ctr., 268 N.L.R.B. 135, 136 (1983) (noting that partial strikes are not protected under Board doctrine); 
Polytech, Inc., 195 N.L.R.B. 695, 696 (1972) (distinguishing intermittent strikes from “genuine” 
strikes). 
 173 EYM King, 365 N.L.R.B. No. 16, at 11. For example, the employer argued that the strike in 
question, as the ninth strike in a series nationwide, ought to be an illegal intermittent strike—but the 
Board noted that despite this commonality the nationwide actions did not affect their analysis here. Id. 
 174 Id. at 11–14. The Board noted that the employees’ purpose in striking was not to harass the 
employer. Id. They also noted that the employer was able to proceed with business operations with but 
a small degree of nuisance. Id. In their rationale, however, the Board only focused on what did not 
occur in this situation, rather than suggesting factors that might have triggered an opposite decision. 
See id. (noting simply that the activities in this case did not rise to the level of illegality). 
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The EYM King decision demonstrates perfectly the unwieldiness of the 
current state of law.175 These employees were not part of a larger union that 
could have offered them guidance on best strike practices.176 Given the subjec-
tivity of the test the Board applied, the decision could have gone the other way 
if the employees had acted in a slightly different manner.177 For example, the 
Board noted that frequency is an important factor, yet offered little guidance on 
how often is too often.178 The Board asked whether the intent was to harass the 
employer, but gave no measuring stick for determining the purpose of a strike.179 
Given the increasing stakes of whether or not these types of strikes fall under 
NLRA protection, many have argued that the NLRB must clarify their decisions 
to create a bright line between protected and unprotected activities.180 
D. The OGC’s Model Brief and Proposed Framework  
for Intermittent Strike Protection 
The OGC’s now-rescinded brief began with the express argument that the 
Board “should clarify its jurisprudence on intermittent and partial strikes and 
extend the [NLRA]’s protection to multiple strikes over the same labor dis-
pute.”181 The brief acknowledged the “imprecise” jurisprudence to date, and 
                                                                                                                           
 175 Becker, supra note 22, at 413 (noting the absence of predictability in current case law), see 
also Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 1 (Aug. 27, 2016) (holding that a brief one-day 
strike was not an intermittent strike). 
 176 See EYM King, 365 N.L.R.B. No. 16, at 3 (noting that employees were not unionized). 
 177 See id. at 11–14. The Board focused on the particular activities of the case without suggesting 
factors that might have led to an opposite outcome. See id. (noting the absence of a specific test that 
could have guided their decision). 
 178 Id. at 11 (balancing the character of the strike with the frequency, and noting that frequency is 
an important factor but not suggesting how frequent would be too frequent). 
 179 Id. at 7. In this prong, the Board cites the oft-quoted question of whether the intent was to 
“harass the employer into a state of chaos,” but seems to offer no concrete definition of “chaos” and 
merely notes that the strike’s impact on the employer was that some customers had to wait a few extra 
minutes to receive their food, and this is not the type of “chaos” envisioned. Id. Moreover, this is 
seemingly inapposite to the well-accepted notion that the very purpose of a strike is to pressure an 
employer. Id. If there were not at least a minute degree of “chaos” associated with a strike, strikes 
would seemingly lose all impact. Id. The Board acknowledges that disruption of employer activities 
does not render a strike unprotected, but still relies on an undefined standard of “chaos” to determine 
whether the strike should be protected. Id. 
 180 Andrias, supra note 51, at 88–89 (noting that the issue of intermittent and partial strikes is ripe 
for Board re-interpretation); W. Melvin Haas III & Carolyn J. Lockwood, The Elusive Law of Inter-
mittent Strikes, 14 LAB. L. 91, 91, 116 (1998) (noting that practical application of the intermittent 
strike doctrine is a difficult task and that the doctrine is “blurred by confusion”); LeRoy, supra note 
64, at 269 (posing the question of why the law should allow full-scale strikes but not smaller, more 
manageable strikes). 
 181 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 1. The Brief starts out by explicitly asking the Board to 
clarify its jurisprudence regarding intermittent and partial strikes. Id. It also asks the Board to extend 
the NLRA’s protection to multiple strikes over the same labor dispute, an area of ambiguity in many 
past cases. Id.; Young, supra note 21 (noting the rescission of OM Memorandum 17-02, the model 
brief regarding intermittent strikes). 
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noted how the lack of precision affects employees.182 Moreover, the brief ar-
gued, there has not been a “compelling rationale” for the declination to extend 
Act protection to non-traditional strikes.183 In light of declining union member-
ship that otherwise would have buoyed protracted strike efforts, short-term 
strikes are becoming an increasingly necessary tool for non-unionized employ-
ees.184 The OGC ultimately asked the Board to extend protection to multiple 
strikes if they meet the specified criteria, and to clarify the difference between 
partial and intermittent strikes.185 Under the criteria, multiple strikes would be 
afforded protection if, (1) work completely ceased and the frequency isn’t such 
that the effort amounts to a work slowdown, (2) the strikes are designed to ex-
ert economic pressure rather than impose permanent conditions of work, and 
(3) the employer is made aware of the reasons behind the strike.186 
With this distinction in place, the OGC brief next questioned the faulty 
logic on which the narrow definition of protected strikes lies.187 Briggs & 
Stratton, the brief argued, lacked any justification for why the activity at issue 
there was unprotected.188 Since that decision, however, the Board has relied on 
it to limit non-traditional strikes.189 In their cases supporting this limitation, the 
Board has relied on three bases: (1) work stoppages should be unprotected 
                                                                                                                           
 182 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 1. The brief cites a number of academic articles that call 
attention to this very issue. Id. at 1 & n.1. The articles date back as far as 1955 and all call for protec-
tion of intermittent strikes. Id. Moreover, many articles argue that current jurisprudence is simply 
contradictory to labor policy, thus necessitating review of the law. Id. 
 183 Id. at 2. This reference to the lack of a “compelling rationale” seemingly invokes cases such as 
Briggs & Stratton, Insurance Agents, and Lodge 76, which failed to fully articulate their holdings, just 
that the Court was so holding because the action was indefensible or that the Board should not reach 
into these areas. Id.; see supra notes 75–118 and accompanying text. See generally Lodge 76, Int’l 
Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisc. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 132, 152–53 
(1976); NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 490 (1960); Int’l Union, Local 232 v. Wisc. 
Emp’t Relations Bd. (Briggs & Stratton), 336 U.S. 245, 264–65 (1949). 
 184 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 2. The OGC here recognizes the trend of increasing num-
bers of short-term strikes, such as the one detailed earlier in the OUR Walmart campaign. Id. 
 185 Id. at 3. The OGC model brief also proposes distinct definitions for partial strikes and inter-
mittent strikes—two categories whose distinctions the Board had previously blurred. Id. Partial strikes 
involve the refusal to perform select portions of a job, such as overtime. Id. Intermittent strikes in-
volve a complete work stoppage, a return to work, and then a subsequent total stoppage. Id. In the 
absence of this distinction, the brief argues, the Board has at times drawn arbitrary lines and at other 
times used “partial strike” as a blanket term describing anything other than a full on “traditional” 
strike. Id. at 4. Adoption of these bright line definitions would aid future Board decisions, and would 
be a necessary first step toward creating a uniform body of rules and case law. Id. 
 186 Id. at 3. For exact text of the proposed framework, see supra note 34 and accompanying text. 
 187 OGC Model Brief at 4 (noting the imprecise legal history of intermittent strike adjudication). 
 188 Id. at 5. Part of the reason for the Briggs & Stratton decision, the brief opines, was that it oc-
curred during a period of significant labor unrest. Id. This may have contributed to the adverse deci-
sion against the employees, as the Supreme Court was seeking to discourage this sort of behavior in 
bargaining. See id. (detailing the history behind the decision). Nevertheless, the OGC seems to sug-
gest that it was a misapplication of law on the Court’s part. Id. 
 189 Becker, supra note 22, at 377 (noting that Briggs & Stratton has since been cited for principles 
such as these that it did not intend to establish). 
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when they are designed to harass and confuse the company, (2) it is inequitable 
when employees can get the benefit of a strike without taking the necessary 
economic risks, and (3) employees do not receive protection when they are 
exerting pressure so as to dictate (rather than bargain for) their own terms and 
conditions.190 The brief then knocked down each of these propositions for rea-
sons such as inapplicability and baselessness.191 
Finally, the OGC brief proposed a new standard for intermittent strikes 
that “appropriately respects the employees’ right to strike.”192 The OGC argued 
that these criteria will ensure that employees will not be able to strike without 
potential economic risks, one of employers’ major concerns.193 Additionally, 
employees cannot, under the proposed test, use intermittent strikes to effectu-
ate a work slowdown as opposed to a complete stoppage.194 Lastly, by making 
their grievances known, employees will not be dictating the terms of employ-
ment, but merely bargaining toward those ends.195 The OGC concluded by urg-
ing the Board to adopt the new standard and correct the rationale used in past 
cases that led to the ambiguous and unfair doctrine today.196 
III. THE MODEL BRIEF WOULD HAVE BROUGHT NEEDED CLARITY BUT 
STILL CONTAINED CURABLE POINTS OF AMBIGUITY 
The OGC’s model brief would have undoubtedly provided a better and 
more coherent option for adjudicating these types of labor claims as opposed 
to attempting to navigate the confusing and contradictory case law in this ar-
                                                                                                                           
 190 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 7–8. 
 191 Id. at 7–12. In response to point (1), the OGC argues that characterizing a strike based on its 
effectiveness is “antithetical” to the entire concept of strikes. Id. at 8. Strikes are designed to exert 
pressure. Id. at 9. Just because one form does that particularly well does not mean it should be unpro-
tected. Id. Moreover, as has been noted in prior cases and the OGC notes again here, employers are 
not without their own self-help tactics. Id. They are free to pursue lockouts or hire replacements in 
response to striking workers. Id. Regarding point (2), the OGC argues that intermittent strikers do 
indeed face economic risk. Id. at 10. Anytime they stop working they will not be paid, and once again, 
an employer may pursue its own tactics to exert economic pressure right back on employees. Id. Final-
ly, regarding point (3), the OGC argues that it is simply baseless to think that intermittent strikers are 
attempting to dictate terms of employment rather than force the employer to bargain. Id. at 11. In 
support of this argument, the OGC cites the Supreme Court’s own logic in a factually similar case 
where the Court held that an intermittent strike is merely a form of strike—not an attempt to impose a 
condition. Id. 
 192 Id. at 12. 
 193 Id. at 13. The Supreme Court has recognized that employees should not have unfettered ability 
to exert economic pressure on employers without a corresponding risk. See Briggs & Stratton, 336 
U.S. at 264 (warning of the dangers of allowing the strike as an absolute right). 
 194 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 3 (noting the differences between work slow-downs, 
which are illegal, and true intermittent strikes). 
 195 Id. at 14. 
 196 Id. (noting the legal ambiguity in which the law currently exists). 
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ea.197 The question remains, however, should a future OGC endeavor to re-
propose this framework, whether the model brief actually would have achieved 
its stated ends.198 Section A discusses the OGC’s attempt at balancing costs and 
benefits to employers and employees in their proposal. 199 Section B suggests 
areas where the OGC model brief, should it ever be re-circulated, could offer 
even more clarity, make the framework easier to apply, and perhaps be more 
agreeable to both employers and employees.200 
A. The Proposed Framework Is Beneficial to Employers and Employees 
First and foremost, any degree of clarity in this area of law would be wel-
comed on both sides of the bargaining table.201 Many employers, however, 
may have felt that the previously proposed framework disproportionately bene-
fits employees.202 Intermittent strikes can be extremely effective when timed 
properly.203 Employers, as previously noted, often need to make extensive 
plans for strikes, such as hiring replacement employees, reassigning manageri-
al employees to different positions, or closing certain operations.204 When the 
strikes are brief, however, such as one day or a half-day, employers may not 
have time to train replacement employees.205 From an employee perspective, 
however, intermittent strikes somewhat minimize, though do not totally negate, 
                                                                                                                           
 197 See id. at 13 (providing adjudication guidance); see also supra notes 75–118 and accompany-
ing text (providing a discussion of the confusing and contradictory case law surrounding intermittent 
strikes). 
 198 See generally OGC Model Brief, supra note 31. The brief proposes a test that the OGC be-
lieves will lead to clarity in this area of law, but it relies on a few terms that could use further preci-
sion. Id. at 3. 
 199 See infra notes 201–222 and accompanying text. 
 200 See infra notes 223–267 and accompanying text. 
 201 See OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 1; Kennedy, supra note 63, at 125–26 (arguing that 
the Board needs to grant protection to intermittent strikes both from a policy perspective and because 
the current doctrine is unwieldy); LeRoy, supra note 64, at 239 (arguing that the current application of 
the NLRA to intermittent strikes is “muddled” and in need of clarification). 
 202 NLRB Considering Potentially Seismic Shift in Labor Law, CUE: AN ORG. FOR POSITIVE EMP. 
REL. (Oct. 6, 2016), http://www.cueinc.com/nlrb-considering-potentially-seismic-shift-in-labor-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/7ZPM-UWPC] (referring to the model brief as “very problematic for employers” 
and noting the NLRB’s unwelcome foray into settled law); David Pryzbylski, The Hits Keep On Coming: 
NLRB General Counsel’s Office Seeks Potential Modifications to the Law Regarding Intermittent Strikes, 
BARNES & THORNBURG LLP (Oct. 5, 2016), http://www.btlaborrelations.com/the-hits-keep-on-coming-
nlrb-general-counsels-office-seeks-potential-modifications-to-the-law-regarding-intermittent-strikes/ 
[https://perma.cc/779S-SE6S] (noting an “aggressive push” to strip employers of NLRA rights). 
 203 See LeRoy, supra note 64, at 256–57 (noting that even rumored or threatened walkouts affect-
ed customers and therefore the employer). 
 204 See id. at 257 (noting employers’ ability to plan for strikes); Spitz et al., supra note 153 (not-
ing that, given the brief and often surprise nature of a one-day strike, employers may be better off 
temporarily reassigning duties to continue business operations). 
 205 Spitz et al., supra note 153 (noting the impracticality of training replacements when strikers 
are expected to return, particularly in the instances of strikes in the fast food industry). 
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the employees’ risk of significant economic loss.206 They may not get paid for 
the day the strike occurred, but they are not missing weeks or months of work 
like employees engaging in traditional strikes.207 
Ultimately, however, these potential harms are similar to the harm em-
ployers thought they would face when strikes were first approved of in the 
NLRA.208 A strike’s relative effectiveness should have no bearing on its pro-
tected status, despite the fact that employers may have more difficulty in re-
sponding to certain tactics.209 Indeed, national labor policy depends on the 
freedom to strike, or the employees’ maintenance of the threat of a strike, in 
order to usher in collective bargaining.210 Erosion of collective bargaining and 
declining unionization, however, make necessary tactics such as intermittent 
strikes so that small groups of employees can exert economic pressure.211 
Internalizing harm for the greater good of national labor policy, however, 
is not likely to sway employers.212 But the proposed framework may not have 
ultimately been as harmful as it would appear.213 To be sure, the model brief 
and proposed framework approved of a strike tactic that employers have vig-
orously fought against.214 In proposing what employees must do to be afforded 
NLRA protection, the OGC also attempted to clarify what employers can ex-
pect from employees.215 If employees fall short of these standards—for exam-
ple, if the striking employees do not make the employer aware of their pur-
                                                                                                                           
 206 See LeRoy, supra note 64, at 257 (noting potential employee benefits in minimizing the length 
of a strike). 
 207 Id. (noting that the limited nature of intermittent strikes can protect employees from large-
scale wage loss). 
 208 Becker, supra note 22, at 352–53 (noting the strike’s traditional role as an “economic weapon” 
within the collective bargaining scheme). 
 209 Swope Ridge Geriatric Ctr., 350 N.L.R.B. 64, 67 (2007) (noting that the envisaged purpose of 
a strike is disruption, and a strike’s legality should not turn on its effectiveness); Allied Mech. Servs., 
Inc., 341 N.L.R.B. 1084, 1102 (2004) (noting the unrealistic expectation for employees to conduct a 
strike which does not affect employer operations); Feinberg & Willis, supra note 78, at 3 (arguing that 
strikes do not lose protection based on their effectiveness). 
 210 GORMAN ET AL., supra note 42, at 47. 
 211 Becker, supra note 22, at 353 (describing the history of a strike and detailing its traditional 
role as an important bargaining tool). 
 212 NLRB Considering Potentially Seismic Shift in Labor Law, supra note 202 (noting that the 
model brief potentially poses large problems for employers). 
 213 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 13–14 (detailing rationales, and potential benefits, for 
clarifying the area of law including, inter alia, predictability for both employees and employers). 
 214 Id. at 1 & n.2 (citing cases where employers have challenged the legality of strikes as unpro-
tected intermittent strikes). 
 215 Id. at 10–12 (noting the Board’s previous contemplation of employer’s rights in intermittent 
and partial strike situations). 
1462 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1433 
pose—the employer can be more assured of their legal footing if they decide to 
take subsequent disciplinary measures.216 
In addition to the benefits of clarity, employers would have been afforded 
additional protections in each prong of the proposed framework.217 The first 
prong, that the stoppage must involve a complete cessation rather than a slow-
down, ensured that employees take a measure of economic risk in striking.218 
Likewise, employers would have been afforded at least some opportunity to 
replace striking workers.219 The second prong, which states that the strike must 
not be designed to impose permanent conditions of work, also protects em-
ployers by assuring that their employees’ purpose will be to bring about nego-
tiations, rather than setting terms unilaterally.220 Finally, the third prong, that 
the employer be made aware of the purpose of the strikes, at a minimum af-
forded an employer the opportunity to negotiate and halt future strikes, and at a 
maximum may provide valuable notice before a strike occurs.221 Altogether, 
while employers could have faced the possibility of an increase in one-day 
strikes, that risk should at least be tolerable due to the clarity and protections 
the framework affords.222 
B. The Proposed Framework Could Be Improved for Employers and 
Employees by Clarifying Areas of Ambiguity 
Were the previously proposed framework adopted verbatim, both em-
ployers and employees would gain a large measure of legal clarity, but there 
                                                                                                                           
 216 Id. at 10, 13 (noting that the proposed framework would actually protect employer’s interests 
by ensuring that intermittent strikers do not receive benefits of a strike without taking on risk that is 
inherent to any strike action). 
 217 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 13–14 (describing the rationale for the proposed frame-
work and the more equitable treatment that both employers and employees receive from the clarifica-
tion). 
 218 Id. The OGC argues that the first prong ensures employees take on at least some risk when 
engaging in a strike. Id. This risk, they argue, is the lack of pay and potential for replacement. Id. This 
also leaves employers with surer footing because they are more accustomed to dealing with these 
types of strike actions. See id. 
 219 See id. (noting that under the proposed framework, employees will not be able to benefit from 
a strike without taking on attendant risks such as replacement or economic loss). 
 220 Id. 
 221 See id. (noting that the third prong ensures that employees will not be able to strike in order to 
achieve non-communicated goals, and implying that employees will have to open some dialogue with 
employers during or before the strike action). 
 222 Id.; Place, supra note 151, at 18 (agreeing with the General Counsel’s conclusion that inter-
mittent strike law needs clarification, but challenging that a multi-factorial test will provide any clarity 
in the area). Place notes that multi-factorial tests still leave too much discretion in the hands of the 
adjudicator, and as such, inconsistent decisions could still happen even with the OGC’s proposed 
framework in place. Place, supra note 151, at 18. Place also notes that the framework could lead to an 
increase in these actions, another reason why a clear-cut framework is necessary. Id. 
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would still be a few points lacking necessary precision.223 In the first prong, 
the OGC proposed that protection should be afforded if multiple strikes “are 
not so . . . frequent that they are tantamount to work slowdowns.”224 First, as 
has been an issue in the past, frequency — how often is too often to strike — 
would likely have been fiercely debated.225 For example, would the Richmond, 
California Walmart workers who went on strike twice within a four-week peri-
od be considered to have gone on strike too often and thus lose protection?226 
Second, whether the strikes are designed to impose permanent work conditions 
or to exert economic pressure is a seemingly subjective test that could benefit 
from a set of objective criteria.227 
Until the remaining points of ambiguity discussed above are defined, the 
OGC’s proposed standard would offer necessary, but insufficient protection to 
employees.228 If it had been adopted verbatim, the Board and courts would still 
have to resolve ambiguity while balancing harm to employers and how much 
latitude to afford striking employees.229 As proven by the erosion of the strike 
                                                                                                                           
 223 See OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 1 (noting the ad hoc nature of the Board’s jurispru-
dence regarding intermittent strikes). The framework still contains a few ambiguous terms and points, 
however. See infra notes 224–267 and accompanying text (discussing these matters). 
 224 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 3, 13 (noting that work slowdowns would be outside of 
the Act’s coverage, as would many other forms of partial strikes). The OGC here notes the importance 
of employees taking on risk when engaging in strike activity. Id. at 10. A complete cessation of work, 
the OGC argues, avoids this issue by allowing employers to replace workers or dock pay. Id. This 
should sufficiently present the employees with risks attendant to strike activity without leaving them 
vulnerable to a course of unlawful discipline. See id. at 10 & n.36 (noting that by providing the 
framework, employers’ fears of employees’ striking risk-free should be quelled). 
 225 See Robertson Indus., 216 N.L.R.B. 361, 362 (1975) (noting the absence of a “magic number” 
in discerning whether multiple work stoppages are unprotected). Compare EYM King of Mo., LLC, 
365 N.L.R.B. No. 16, 12 (Jan. 24, 2017) (noting that a one day action is plainly not “intermittent” and 
that in past cases two separate days of striking did not cross the threshold, but offering little guidance 
on what amount of frequency would make a series of strikes intermittent), and U.S. Serv. Indus., 315 
N.L.R.B. 285, 285–86 (1994) (holding that multiple strikes, without evidence of intent to harass, do 
not make strikes unprotected intermittent strikes), with Honolulu Rapid Transit Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 
1806, 1807–11 (1954) (holding a series of weekend strikes to be unprotected and therefore an em-
ployer can suspend striking workers). By way of example, the model brief notes a few instances that 
would be considered too frequent. OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 13. A ten-minute strike every 
thirty minutes, or an hourly work stoppage once employees reach a quota are two examples. Id. 
 226 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 118, 1 (Aug. 27, 2016) (describing a series of 
strikes involving particular employees at a Walmart store and finding that the strike activities did not 
constitute an unprotected intermittent strike). 
 227 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 13. Once again, the OGC somewhat blindly asserts that 
instances of these specific strikes should be obvious from the facts, but there would still likely be 
cases on the margins of acceptability. Id. 
 228 See id. at 4 (arguing that the proposed framework offers necessary clarity); Place, supra note 
151, at 18 (agreeing with the General Counsel’s conclusion that intermittent strike law needs clarifica-
tion, but challenging that a multi-factorial test will provide any clarity in the area). 
 229 See OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 4 (noting that the proposed framework attempts to 
better balance employer and employee rights); Place, supra note 151, at 18 (noting the potential clari-
ty that could be offered in this field). Were the Board to adopt the argument, it would still take multi-
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over time, leaving this balancing of interests up to interpretation will likely 
lead to a promulgation of vague adjudication.230 Accordingly, the OGC would 
be wise to amend their argument to promote specificity, or alternatively, the 
Board should resolve these points of ambiguity in the event they adopt the 
proposed framework.231 
1. The Frequency Prong of the OGC’s Framework Remains Ambiguous, 
Preventing Adoption of a Clear Workable Standard 
To promote consistent adjudication, the OGC or the Board could and 
should decide how many strikes in a given number of weeks is so frequent that 
the actions are not entitled to Section 7 protection.232 The way the standard is 
set up now, however, lends itself to a case-by-case basis adjudication.233 
Whether a series of strikes “are not so brief and frequent that they are tanta-
mount to work slowdowns” is a subjective standard.234 The answer could vary 
based on, inter alia, the number of employees striking, the total number of 
employees, the size of the business, the work that they are doing, and much 
more.235 This inherent subjectivity does not ultimately protect employees’ best 
interests; an economically superior employer could simply drag the employees 
into protracted litigation.236 Ultimately, because the OGC did not propose a 
                                                                                                                           
ple applications to different sets of facts to establish a solid body of precedent on which parties could 
rely. See OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 4 (defining what an intermittent strike is, yet doing so 
using some terms that are still somewhat ambiguous). 
 230 Becker, supra note 22, at 353–54 (noting the slow erosion of the strike from an economic 
weapon for employees to one that is often bargained away during negotiations and left toothless). 
 231 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 14 (noting the need for clarity in this area of jurispru-
dence). 
 232 See id. at 13. The brief suggests that multiple strikes over the same labor dispute would be 
protected, but fails to articulate what that may look like in practice. Id. If proposed again in the future, 
the brief could simply state a number that would constitute too many strikes. See generally id. The 
Model Brief does not provide clarity on situations, such as the OUR Walmart strikes, that occurred 
over a number of weeks. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 364 N.L.R.B. No. 118, at 1 (describing a series of 
strikes in one Walmart store). 
 233 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 6–7. The model brief cites to Lodge 76, International Ass’n 
of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission where the Su-
preme Court suggested case-by-case adjudication in order to establish the bounds of protection. See 
Lodge 76, Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Wisc. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 427 U.S. 
132, 152 (1976); OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 6. That strategy is likely too time consuming and 
could be easily remedied with Board or OGC guidance. OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 6. 
 234 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 13. 
 235 See id. (detailing the framework for intermittent strike adjudication, without diving into specif-
ics that might influence findings at each prong). 
 236 See id. (detailing the proposed prongs for adjudication); Becker, supra note 22, at 352 (noting 
that employers’ economic superiority has directly influenced the decreasing number of strikes); Law-
rence E. Dubé, Intermittent Strike Doctrine Could Get Boost from NLRB, LAB. & EMP. ON BLOOM-
BERG L. (Oct. 24, 2016), https://www.bna.com/intermittent-strike-tactic-n57982079023/ [https://
perma.cc/3KQK-W9K6] (noting that more strikes could lead to protracted litigation). 
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magic number, employees would have to wait for case law to develop on the 
subject before being able to safely design strikes.237 In fact, the model brief 
seemingly suggested that the number of strikes that would be protected could 
be infinite so long as the three criteria of the framework are met.238 
Case law on the issue of frequency, however, indicates that frequency is 
bound up with the issue of the employer’s ability to respond to the strike, that 
is, the strikes only become too frequent when they effectively become work 
slowdowns.239 Indeed the proposed framework itself adopted this view by pro-
posing that the strikes may not be so frequent that they become tantamount to 
slowdowns.240 Surprise walkouts, for example, can be left without protection 
when employers cannot adequately respond and properly carry on their busi-
ness.241 It appears that frequency is too closely related to the circumstances of 
each action for there ever to be a magic number that would promote clarity.242 
Given that frequency is indirectly bound with the employer’s ability to 
adequately respond, and such ability to respond will vary based on each unique 
circumstance, the framework could be both clearer and more fairly balanced 
by adopting a strike notice provision.243 If the employees give proper notice of 
their intent to completely stop working, they would avoid a situation where the 
                                                                                                                           
 237 Oswalt, supra note 117, at 659 & n.394 (noting that the Board and the courts have been large-
ly left to establish frequency on their own, with the sole guidance being that two strikes in a row gen-
erally do not fall outside NLRA protection). 
 238 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 13 (arguing simply that multiple strikes, even over the 
same dispute, should be afforded protection if they fall under the framework). 
 239 Embossing Printers, Inc., 268 N.L.R.B. 710, 711–12, 722–24 (1984) (declining to extend 
protection to three instances of walkouts); Western Wirebound Box Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 748, 761–62 
(1971) (declining to extend protection to two surprise short-term walkouts during a four week period); 
Armour & Co., 25 N.L.R.B. 989, 993–96 (1940) (extending protection where employees ceased work-
ing for an hour after reaching a work quota). The OGC Model Brief emphasizes the “complete cessa-
tion of work” portion of the framework by arguing that only a complete cessation would achieve the 
proper balance between the risk to employees’ and employers’ retention of their own rights to contin-
ue business operations. OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 10–11. 
 240 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 13. 
 241 See, e.g., New Fairview Hall Convalescent Home, 206 N.L.R.B. 688, 701–02 (1973) (declin-
ing to extend protection to three mid-day walkouts); W. Wirebound Box Co., 191 N.L.R.B. at 761–62 
(declining to extend protection to two surprise short-term walkouts during a four-week period). Partial 
strikes are unprotected for much the same reason. See Kennedy, supra note 63, at 125 (noting that 
during partial strikes, the operations of a company can become defunct when employees refuse to do 
specific tasks). Striking multiple times within the same day may ultimately have a similar effect to a 
partial strike, and therefore would be untenable. See id. (noting the differences between intermittent 
and partial strikes); OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 13 (noting that multiple strikes during the 
same day would not be afforded protection). 
 242 Robertson Indus., 216 N.L.R.B. at 362 (noting the absence of a “magic number” in discerning 
whether multiple work stoppages are unprotected). 
 243 Id. (noting that the frequency prong both assures employees take on risk and employers are 
given opportunity to respond); see Int’l Union, Local 232 v. Wisc. Emp’t Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245, 
249 (1949) (Briggs & Stratton) (noting that one of the cornerstones of the employees’ illegal strikes 
was reliance on lack of notice to inflict as much harm to the employer as possible). 
1466 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 59:1433 
strikes become “tantamount to work slowdowns.”244 Moreover, notice of a 
strike provides employers with the ability to exercise their right to continue 
their business operations.245 In the 2017 NLRB decision EYM King of Mis-
souri, LLC, a one-day strike was protected even though the employer received 
late notice of the strike.246 Adopting a notice provision would avoid a situation 
where the Board could decide that the strikes were too frequent, and also bal-
ances employer and employee rights during a strike.247 
Under current law, most employees do not have to provide notice prior to 
a walkout or other strike.248 There is currently an exception for the health care 
industry, where Congress passed legislation mandating ten days notice.249 It is 
also not uncommon for collective bargaining agreements (“CBA”) between an 
employer and a union to set forth their own agreed-upon notice requirements, 
and in any event, CBAs have their own separate Act-mandated notice require-
ments.250 In the absence of a CBA, as in the case of non-union employees, no-
tice requirements are noticeably absent from current law.251 
                                                                                                                           
 244 See David Westfall & Gregor Thüsing, Strikes and Lockouts in Germany and Under Federal 
Legislation in the United States: A Comparative Analysis, 22 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 29, 57 
(1999) (noting the importance of notice to the employer towards ushering in collective bargaining, and 
giving the employer an opportunity to continue business as usual). 
 245 See id. (noting that, with notice, employers will have a better opportunity to prepare for a 
strike and take steps, such as hiring replacement workers, to avoid any harm). 
 246 EYM King, 365 N.L.R.B. No. 16, at 6 (noting that the employees notified the manager of the 
strike only after they had not shown up for work). The court did note, however, that the employer was 
able to continue operating with only minimal disturbance stemming from the strike. Id. at 12. 
 247 Westfall & Thüsing, supra note 244, at 57 (discussing the importance of notice procedures). 
 248 Schwartz, supra note 20 (noting that most union and non-union employees cannot be disci-
plined for lack of notice of a strike). 
 249 29 U.S.C. 158 § 8(g) (2012). The notice needs to set forth the intended date and time of the 
action, and can be negotiated once issued. Id. The reader should note that the ten-day requirement 
ahead of a strike applies solely to unionized employees of healthcare institutions, rather than merely 
any employee at a healthcare institution. Scott Faust, NLRB to Healthcare Employers Facing a Strike: 
You Can Ask, but Employees Don’t Have to Tell, PROSKAUER LAB. REL. UPDATE (July 6, 2011), 
https://www.laborrelationsupdate.com/nlrb/employer-policies/nlrb-to-healthcare-employers-facing-a-
strike-you-can-ask-but-employees-dont-have-to-tell/ [https://perma.cc/8RA3-XG74]. Healthcare em-
ployers can ask employees questions such as the anticipated duration of the strike in order to line up 
replacements, but notably, employees can decline to answer. Id. 
 250 Collective Bargaining (Section 8(d) & 8(b)(3)), NAT’L LAB. REL. BOARD (Mar. 8, 2018), 
https://www.nlrb.gov/rights-we-protect/whats-law/unions/collective-bargaining-section-8d-8b3 
[https://perma.cc/P5KV-LXWW]. CBA’s have their own Act-mandated notice requirements regarding 
parties’ intentions for the period when their agreement would otherwise be subject to termination, 
modification or expiration—the period of time that most frequently generates employee collective 
action in furtherance of the bargaining process. Id. If a party intends to modify or terminate a CBA, 
the party must provide notice sixty days prior to the CBA’s termination. Id. Once notice is served, 
employees must wait sixty days before participating in an economic strike. Id. This sixty-day period is 
referred to as a “cooling off” period, during which the goal is to avoid the strike altogether. Id. 
 251 Kevin C. McCormick, Who Says There’s No Free Lunch?, 24 No. 10 Md. Emp. L. Letter 3 
(West, July 2014) (describing an instance where restaurant employees went on strike at 7:30 A.M. 
after providing notice of their strike that same morning); John P. Hasman, Fast-Food Restaurant 
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The ten-day notice period required of health care institutions may be exces-
sive in other areas of employment, but the concept itself is a sound one.252 In 
retail or dining, a notice period of one to two days may be sufficient time to af-
ford employers an ability to replace striking workers while still preserving the 
effectiveness of the strike.253 Accordingly, in order to promote clarity in the “fre-
quency” section while balancing rights, the OGC could adopt a mandated notice 
period of a few days prior to a walkout.254 Further, adopting a strict notice provi-
sion would avoid the temptation to hold that a strike was too frequent because it 
was too effective. 255 This notice period would help solve the issue of intermit-
tent stoppages becoming “tantamount to slowdowns” by giving the employer an 
opportunity to take steps to continue business as usual, and therefore avoid the 
issue of putting a fixed number on how many strikes is too many.256 
2. The Economic Pressure vs. Imposition of Conditions Prong Remains 
Ambiguous, Preventing Adoption of a Clear Workable Standard 
The framework’s second prong states that multiple strikes should be pro-
tected if “they are not designed to impose permanent conditions of work, but 
rather . . . to exert economic pressure.”257 In other words, the purpose of the 
strike needs to be to force the employer to the bargaining table, rather than, for 
                                                                                                                           
Strikes Spread to St. Louis, 23 No. 5 Mo. Emp. L. Letter 3 (West, July 2013) (noting that all employ-
ees covered by the NLRA, with limited exceptions, have the right to participate in walkouts and other 
strikes). 
 252 S. REP. NO. 93-766, 93RD CONG., 2d SESS. (1974) (noting the importance for healthcare insti-
tutions to be given proper notice in order to make adequate arrangements); Eli Naduris-Weissman, 
The Worker Center Movement & Traditional Labor Law: A Contextual Analysis, 30 BERKLEY J. EMP. 
& LAB. L. 232, 304 (2009) (noting the importance of Section 8(g) in the health care industry in ensur-
ing healthcare services can continue with minimal interruption). 
 253 See EYM King, 365 N.L.R.B. No. 16, at 6 (explaining that employees notified the manager of 
the strike only after they had not shown up for work, but ultimately finding against the employer for 
committing an unfair labor practice by disciplining the employees). In EYM King, the Board noted 
that despite the lack of notice, the employer could still carry on operations with minimal disturbance. 
Id. 
 254 See Naduris-Weissman, supra note 252, at 304 (noting the importance of Section 8(g) in the 
healthcare industry in ensuring healthcare services can continue with minimal interruption). See gen-
erally OGC Model Brief, supra note 31 (lacking mention of a notice provision regarding intermittent 
strikes). 
 255 Kennedy, supra note 63 at 125 (noting that Section 7 affords broad protection to concerted 
activities, without a qualifier regarding the effectiveness of said concerted activities). Indeed, as labor 
law policy dictates, just because a strike is effective does not mean it should lose protection. Becker, 
supra note 22, at 387–88 (noting that effectiveness should not dictate legality). 
 256 S. REP. NO. 93-766 (noting the importance of avoiding work slowdowns by adopting a notice 
provision prior to work stoppages); OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 3 (arguing strikes should not 
be protected when they are tantamount to work slowdowns). 
 257 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 3. 
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example, striking every Friday because the employees do not want to work on 
Fridays anymore.258 
The OGC’s brief somewhat addresses this potential problem.259 They ar-
gue that intermittent strikes are no more dangerous than full-on strikes with 
regards to dictating conditions.260 By the nature of their activity, however, in-
termittent strikers have a much greater opportunity to dictate hours and condi-
tions than do full on strikers.261 The no Friday-work example above illustrates 
that potential.262 Here, however, the third prong of the OGC test comes into 
play: that the “employer is made aware of the employees’ purpose in strik-
ing.”263 Only by holding striking employees to a stringent standard at the third 
prong can issues in the second prong be avoided.264 The best way to ensure a 
fair solution of this issue would again be through the notice provision.265 No-
tice provisions, at a minimum, can shed light on ongoing disputes, and give a 
proactive employer a few days to better understand the underlying issue.266 
Notice provisions for intermittent strikes would do much the same, and it 
                                                                                                                           
 258 See NLRB v. Ins. Agents’ Int’l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 496–97 & n.28 (1960) (noting absence 
of evidence that employees were attempting to unilaterally establish work conditions). 
 259 See OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 11 (arguing that intermittent strikes and full-on 
strikes are likely equally able to dictate terms and conditions of work). 
 260 Id. (noting generally that, with regards to attempts to set their own hours, intermittent strikes 
and traditional strikes are virtually indistinguishable). 
 261 See id. (noting that workers who strike on an intermittent basis and workers who engage in 
full-on strikes have negligibly different opportunities to dictate terms and conditions of employment); 
Becker, supra note 22, at 355 (noting that short-term strikes are likely a more representative manifes-
tation of urgent labor disputes). 
 262 See supra notes 257–258 and accompanying text (providing an example of employees at-
tempting to dictate terms and conditions of employment). By holding “intermittent strikes” only on 
Fridays, the employees are effectively saying they will not work on Fridays, and doing so without 
formal bargaining negotiations. See id. Such a result would plainly be untenable. See OGC Model 
Brief, supra note 31, at 13 (arguing that employees should not be allowed to dictate their terms and 
conditions of work through strikes, but merely force employers to bargain on the subject). 
 263 OGC Model Brief, supra note 31, at 13. If employees must make employers aware of their 
purpose in striking under the terms of the framework, it would be much easier to avoid situations 
where the strikes are simply transparent attempts to impose conditions, rather than to usher in bargain-
ing. See id. (noting that attempts to dictate terms and conditions of employment would not be legal 
under the framework). 
 264 See id. (proposing that employees must make employers aware of their purpose in striking). 
When employers are informed of the purpose in striking, it will be much easier to determine whether 
the employees are attempting to effectuate work conditions or simply exert pressure to usher in collec-
tive bargaining. See id. Without an explicit notice, it is up to the trier of fact to make this determina-
tion based on non-explicit evidence. See id. 
 265 See The Right to Strike, supra note 150 (describing notice provisions under Section 8(g) for 
hospitals, and describing that such provisions are necessary to effectuate proper preparations ahead of 
a strike action). 
 266 See S. REP. NO. 93-766 (describing the policy goals of Section 8(g), such as providing proper 
notice so the employer can make necessary strike preparations). 
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would be much easier for an employer to analyze whether the strike is de-
signed to impose work conditions or are for exerting economic pressure.267 
CONCLUSION 
After decades of inconsistent decisions by the courts and the NLRB that 
often rely on dicta and uncertainty on both sides of the bargaining table, the 
time is ripe for reexamining intermittent strike jurisprudence. Clarity is essen-
tial to providing both employers and employees with legal certainty in negoti-
ating and maintaining their relationships. 
The OGC of the NLRB, under President Obama, ultimately concluded that 
more protection is necessary for intermittent strikes because of the current state 
of organized labor. In place of massive and powerful unions are smaller grass-
roots campaigns that require different negotiating tactics to effectively support 
non-unionized workers. The OGC’s framework, now-rescinded after the admin-
istration change, would have armed the grassroots movements with an expansion 
of permitted strike activity, and permitted employers to understand and exercise 
their own rights when employees engage in these types of strikes. 
The framework, however, still would have fallen short on the important 
question of frequency—how many strikes are too frequent. The model brief 
seemed to suggest that as long as employees remained within the framework, 
the strike would be legal, but this result may have tipped the scales too heavily 
in favor of employees—and could have been the reason it was recently re-
scinded. One way to fix this issue may be to add a strict notice provision to the 
formerly proposed framework, so that employers are able to effectively re-
spond to one-day strikes and continue their operations. This would properly 
protect employers and further promote clarity on both sides. Moreover, a no-
tice provision would promote coherent expression of the employees’ reasons 
for striking, avoiding many of the issues employers face when employees 
strike. Ultimately the framework should have been welcomed by both employ-
ers and employees because of the clarity it would have offered, but it appears 
that, for now, intermittent strikes remain in a state of haziness and unease. 
Wouldn’t it be nice if the law were clearer, then we wouldn’t have to wait so 
long to determine whether a given strike deserved NLRA protection. 
THOMAS B. FIASCONE 
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